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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Thomas Rasmussen appeals from the district court's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order of Disbarment in the underlying attorney
discipline case. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over attorney discipline
matters pursuant to Utah Constitution article VIII, section 4, which provides that
"[t]he Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission
to practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law."
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE I:

The trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction by entertaining the

OPC's objection to Rasmussen's reinstatement that was filed more than ten days
after Rasmussen's petition because the reinstatement was not governed by Rule
14-524 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
Preservation: This issue was preserved in The Office of Professional
Conduct's Reply to Reply to its Memorandum in Opposition to Order of
Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen. (R. at 216).
Standard of Review.

In attorney discipline cases, the trial court's

interpretation of rules is reviewed for correctness. In re Discipline of Schwenke,
89 P.3d 117, 120 (Utah 2004). Additionally, whether a trial court has subject
matter jurisdiction is a question of law which is reviewed "under a correction of
error standard." Xiao Yang Li v. University of Utah, 2006 UT 57 fl 7, 144 P.3d
1142.
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ISSUE II:

The trial court had discretion to consider the OPC's Opposition

to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen as a post-judgment motion
pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Preservation: Notwithstanding the fact the trial court did not state it was
viewing the OPC's objection as a rule 60(b) post-judgment motion, it entertained
the motion, and in its March 29, 2011, Order granted, in part, the relief requested
by the OPC in its motion. (R. at 262).
Standard of Review: Trial courts have broad discretion in ruling on relief
from a judgment and the decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Russell
v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193. 1194 (Utah 1984).
ISSUE III: The trial court correctly weighed any aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, and properly ruled that the appropriate sanction for Rasmussen's
violation of the terms of his suspension should be more severe than the original
sanction.
Preservation and Standard of Review: A trial court's findings of fact are
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. In re Discipline of Crawley, 2007
UT 44 ^f 17, 164 P.3d 1232. The Supreme Court makes its own independent
determination as to the appropriate sanction in attorney discipline cases. In re
Discipline of Ennenga, 2001 UT 111, IT 9-10, 37 P.3d 11 SODETERMINATIVE LAW
The following rules are fully set forth in the Addendum to Brief of Appellee,
submitted herewith:
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A.

Rule 14-6. Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.

B.

Rules 14-501, 14-509, 14-511, 14-512, 14-524, 14-525, and 14-526
of the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD").

C.

Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below: This is an
appeal in an attorney discipline case of an Order of the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, Honorable Judge Dever, disbarring attorney Thomas V.
Rasmussen from the practice of law for violating the terms of an order of
suspension.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On July 21, 2010, the Honorable Judge Dever entered an Order of
Sanctions suspending Rasmussen from the practice of law for one year, staying
all but 181 days, for violating Rules 8.4(a) and 8.4(d) of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct. (R. at 145-169). On January 24, 2011, Rasmussen filed a
Verified Petition for Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen. (R. at 204-206).
On January 24, 2011, Rasmussen also filed an Affidavit of Thomas V.
Rasmussen attesting to the court that he had not practiced law for a total of 181
days up to the time of his anticipated reinstatement. (R. at 207-208).
In preparation for its response to Rasmussen's petition, and pursuant to
rule 14-525 of the RLDD, the Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC"), served
Rasmussen with interrogatories and requests for production on February 1,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2011. (R. at 211).

Furthermore, the OPC prepared notice of Rasmussen's

petition for reinstatement to be published in the next edition of the Utah Bar
Journal as required by rule 14-524(d). (R. at 227).
On February 17, 2011, Rasmussen delivered to the OPC, and submitted to
the trial court, a proposed Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen.
The trial court signed the Order on the same day. (R. at 213). On the following
day, February 18, 2011, not knowing the trial court had already signed the order,
the OPC mailed its Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of
Thomas V. Rasmussen.

(R. at 215-218). The opposition was based on the

OPC's position that Rasmussen's Order for Reinstatement was premature
because, pursuant to rule 14-525, the OPC had 60 days in which to object to the
petition for reinstatement upon which the order was based. (R. at 215).
In response to the OPC's objection, on February 25, 2011, Rasmussen
filed a Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas
V. Rasmussen, in which he asserted, for the first time, that his reinstatement was
governed by the provisions of rule 14-524, and as a result, the OPC's objection
was filed too late.1 (R. at219).
Upon learning that the trial court had already signed the Order of
Reinstatement, and that Rasmussen was claiming reinstatement under the
provisions of rule 14-524, the OPC filed its Reply to its Memorandum in

1

As will be discussed in more detail below, 14-525 allows 60 days for the OPC to
object, whereas 14-524 allows only 10 days.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
4 may contain errors.

Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen on February 25,
2011, arguing that because the original suspension was for a term of one year,
with all but 181 days stayed, Rasmussen's suspension should be categorized as
being more than six months, and therefore, his reinstatement should be
governed by rule 14-525. The OPC further informed the trial court that it would
oppose reinstatement based on information it had received that Rasmussen had
continued to practice law while on suspension. (R. at 216-222). In its brief, the
OPC asked the trial court to set aside the Order of Reinstatement it had signed
on February 17, 2011. (R. at 222).
The trial court held a hearing (the "Affirmation Hearing")2, on March 8,
2011. (R. at 241). At the hearing the trial court stated it was its original intention
that Rasmussen's suspension be for one year, and that his reinstatement "fall
underneath 525." (R. at 558 p. 25). However, the trial court acknowledged its
original sanctions order was not clear as to the period of suspension and that
Rasmussen had relied on his interpretation that he was suspended for less than
six months. (R. at 558 p.25-27). In "the interest of fair play and equity," the trial
court determined it could not set aside the Order of Reinstatement. (]d.)

With

regard to the OPC's request to present evidence that Rasmussen had practiced
law while on suspension, the trial court ruled from the bench as follows:

2

In the Brief of Appellant, Rasmussen assigns various names to the orders of the
trial court (i.e. "Affirmation Order"), and hearings before the trial court (i.e.
"Motion Hearing). To avoid confusion before this Court, the OPC will use the
same designations assigned by Rasmussen.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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THE COURT: I think that if there's any problems with what he's done
during that 181 days, certainly the OPC has the right to come back
before the Court here and see if he violated the conditions of his
suspension; and the Court then can entertain whether or not there
should be another charge Mr. Rasmussen [sic] or an additional
period of suspension ordered in this case.
(R. at 558 p. 27).
At the conclusion of the Affirmation Hearing, the trial court asked the OPC
to prepare a written order.

Qd.)

However, prior to the OPC submitting its

proposed Order, Rasmussen submitted to the trial court his own proposed order
that read, in part, "In the interest of fair play and equity, the Court will not set
aside its Order of Reinstatement dated February 17, 2011, as it was signed
consistent with Rule 14-524, of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability."
(R. at 265-266). The OPC objected to the language in the proposed order

i

because the trial court had made no findings with regard to rule 14-524. (R. at
242-243). The Order ("Affirmation Order") ultimately issued by the trial court on
March 30, 2011, read:
The Court will not set aside its Order of reinstatement dated
February 17, 2011. Thus, said Order will remain in full force and
effect. However, the OPC may bring any information to the Court
that it might have that Mr. Rasmussen acted in violation of its Order
of Sanctions in this case dated July 20, 2010.
(R. at 262-263).
Accordingly, on March 17, 2011, the OPC filed with the trial court its
Motion for the Court to Consider Evidence of Thomas v. Rasmussen's Failure to
Comply with its Sanctions Order. (R. at 245-259). The OPC submitted evidence
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'

to the trial court that, during the term of his suspension, Rasmussen had "made
36 appearances on cases [and] filed 17 pleadings in cases." (R. at 251, 258259).
In his response to the motion, Rasmussen asserted that for the cases in
which he appeared or filed pleadings during his suspension, he was either, 1)
withdrawing as required by rule 36 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; 2)
performing work "in an effort to not leave [his] pre-suspension clients with the
feeling of abandonment and also to avoid any potential complaints" to the OPC;
or 3) postponing completion of the case until after being reinstated. (R. at 269270). Rasmussen also stated that in contrast to the approximately twenty cases
he worked on during his suspension, he would typically be retained on 108 new
cases during a six month period of time. Thus, Rasmussen viewed his conduct
as constituting "substantial compliance" with the trial court's order that he not
practice law for 181 days. (R. at 270).
Furthermore, Rasmussen stated during the term of his suspension it was
necessary for him to incur, on average, $11,000 a month in office expenses in
order to maintain a continuing presence in the community. (R. at 270).
The trial court held a hearing (the "Motions Hearing") on May 19, 2011. (R.
at 521).

At the hearing, the trial court questioned Rasmussen about his

appearances in court:
THE COURT: When was that appearance with Judge Trease?
MR. RASMUSSEN: December 17th. So D e c - Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
7 may contain errors.

THE COURT: How can you argue that you have a right to go to
Court on December 17th when you're suspended on August until
February?
MR. RASMUSSEN: I should not have done that. I should not have
done that. There's no question that I made judgment calls that were
probably, in hindsight, errant judgment calls to try to facilitate clients.
Mr. Walker does not know what conversations I did or did not have
with those clients.
THE COURT: Well, how could you take on new cases and enter
appearances of Counsel in cases during the period of time when
you're suspended by me?
MR. RASMUSSEN: There were a couple where I did that, Judge,
and I'm - THE COURT: Well, he says there's seven of them.
MR. RASMUSSEN: Well, I was going to lose my house. I was going
to lose everything that I've worked 30 years for. I've had other
attorneys come up to me after the fact and say, "Boy, if you'd have
just asked we would have taken over your practice and helped you
out."
Well, my mind doesn't think that way. I'm not scheming for ways to
intentionally deceive; but Judge, this has been devastating to me. I
have incurred over $100,000 in debt, used up my savings. I have a
house that is almost paid that was at risk. I have the - - kind of the
infrastructure of a law practice I was desiring to return to and did
return to that was at risk.
I was hoping not to lose everything in life, and I definitely, definitely,
definitely curtailed my efforts except when it became life or death, if
you will, in terms of my complete and utter financial ruin.
(R. at 557 p. 15-16).
After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court issued an Order
e "Disbarment Order"), on July 19, 2011, finding that Rasmussen had
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continued to practice law while on suspension, and concluding that the
appropriate sanction for his conduct was disbarment. (R. at 522-526).
Rasmussen is appealing that order.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

It was the intent of the trial court, and the understanding of the O P C ,

that Rasmussen's original suspension was for a period of one year, and that his
reinstatement would be governed by the provisions of rule 14-525. Thus, the
O P C would have 60 days in which to oppose reinstatement, rather than the 10
days allowed under rule 14-524 for a suspension lasting six months or less.
Because the OPC's opposition was filed within 60 days of Rasmussen's verified
petition for reinstatement, it was timely and the trial court did not err in
considering the motion.
II.

The trial court has broad discretion in considering whether to

consider a post-judgment motion, and whether to view an inadequately captioned
motion as a rule 60(b) motion for post-judgment relief. In the present case the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in viewing the OPC's objection to the order
of reinstatement as a post-judgment motion or in allowing the O P C to present
evidence that Rasmussen violated the terms of his suspension. The doctrine of
res judicata did not bar the trial court's consideration of Rasmussen's conduct
because the issue was not, and could not have been, litigated in the OPC's
original objection to the proposed order of reinstatement.
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III.

Consistent with case law from this Court, the trial court correctly

determined that Rasmussen's sanction for continuing to practice law while on
suspension should be more severe than the original term of suspension.
Furthermore, the trial court properly found that Rasmussen's need for money
was not a mitigating circumstance, and that, considering the aggravating factors,
disbarment was the appropriate sanction.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE REINSTATEMENT PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT CONDUCTED
PURSUANT TO RLDD 14-524, THEREFORE NEITHER THE TRIAL
COURT NOR THE OPC WERE CONSTRAINED BY THE TEN-DAY
OBJECTION PERIOD.
Depending on the length of the suspension, reinstatements are governed

by either RLDD Rule 14-524 or 14-525. Rule 14-524 provides, in its entirety,
that:
A respondent who has been suspended for six months or less
pursuant to disciplinary proceedings shall be reinstated at the end of
the period of suspension upon filing with the district court and
serving upon OPC counsel an affidavit stating that the respondent
has fully complied with the requirements of the suspension order and
that the respondent has fully reimbursed the Bar's Lawyer's Fund for
Client Protection for any amounts paid on account of the
respondent's conduct. Within ten days, OPC counsel may file an
objection and thereafter the district court shall conduct a hearing.
(Emphasis added). In contrast, RLDD 14-525 provide, in part, that:
(a) Generally. A respondent suspended for more than six months or a
disbarred respondent shall be reinstated or readmitted only upon order of
the district court. No respondent may petition for reinstatement until three
months before the period for suspension has expired....
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(b) Petition. A petition for reinstatement or readmission shall be verified,
filed with the district court...
(d) Publication of notice of petition. At the time respondent files a petition
for reinstatement or readmission, O P C counsel shall publish notice of the
petition in the Utah Bar Journal....
(f) Review of petition. Within 60 days after receiving a respondent's
petition for reinstatement or readmission, O P C counsel shall either: (f)(1)
advise the respondent and the district court that O P C counsel will not
object to the respondent's reinstatement or readmission; or (f)(2) file a
written objection to the petition.
(g) Hearing; report. If an objection is filed by O P C counsel, the district
court, as soon as reasonably practicable and within a target date of 90
days of the filing of the petition, shall conduct a hearing...
(Emphasis added). The issue of whether Rasmussen's suspension and
reinstatement were governed by the provisions of 14-524 or 14-525 is not directly
before this Court. While Rasmussen has maintained the provisions of 14-524
are applicable, the O P C has urged the application of 14-525. Although the trial
court stated it was its original intent that 14-525 would govern, it never
specifically ruled under which provision it was reinstating Rasmussen, and
neither party has specifically appealed this issue. In fact, because the trial court
signed the order reinstating Rasmussen, the procedural question of whether it
was pursuant to 14-524 or 14-525 is likely moot.
However, whereas Rasmussen is arguing the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction by not enforcing the time limits imposed by 14-524, and whereas the
O P C maintains that the proceedings were not conducted pursuant to 14-524, a
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brief discussion of this issue may be necessary to permit this Court to properly
consider Rasmussen's argument.
The question of whether 14-524 or 14-525 applies comes down to a
determination of whether Rasmussen was suspended for a period greater than,
or less than, six months.
A. The Conduct of the Parties Evidenced an Understanding that
Rasmussen's Suspension was Governed by 14-525, Rather than
14-524.
In its original Order of Sanction, the trial court imposed "a suspension of
one year in this matter but will stay all but 181 days." (R. at 169). Near the end
of the 181 days, Rasmussen submitted to the trial court a Verified Petition for
Reinstatement. (R. at 204). Such a petition is required by 14-525, not by 14524. In his petition, Rasmussen petitioned the court to "please reinstate me at
the earliest possible time." id. Whereas, absent an objection from the OPC,
reinstatement under 14-524 is automatic upon expiration of the period of
suspension, a request to be reinstated "at the earliest possible time" is more
consistent with a petition filed pursuant to 14-525, where the trial court must take
specific action before reinstatement can occur.
On the same day as he filed his verified petition, Rasmussen filed an
Affidavit of Thomas V. Rasmussen, the only substantive averment of which was,
"I have not practiced law for a total of 181 days up to the time of my anticipated
reinstatement in this matter." (R. at 208). The affidavit made no mention as to
his compliance with the other requirements of his suspension or reimbursement
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to the Bar's Lawyer Fund for Client Protection, as would be required of an
affidavit filed under 14-524.
After receiving the verified petition, OPC counsel prepared a notice of the
proposed reinstatement to be printed in the Utah Bar Journal. (R. at 227). This
notice is required by 14-525, not 14-524. Shortly after filing his verified petition
Rasmussen submitted to the trial court a proposed Order of Reinstatement. (R.
at 213). Again, such an order is required by 14-525, not 14-524.
It is apparent from the conduct of the parties that it was understood
Rasmussen's reinstatement was governed by the provisions of 14-525 rather
than 14-524. Thus, it was reasonable for the OPC to conclude it had 60 days in
which to file its objection, rather than the 10 days sought to be imposed by
Rasmussen after the fact.
B. It Was the Intent of the Trial Court that Rasmussen's
Reinstatement be Governed by 14-525, Not 14-524.
Though not binding on an appellate court, the trial court's interpretation of
its own order should be given great weight. See, Tucker v. State of Kansas, 711
P.2d 1343, 1344 (Kan. App. 1986) ("we are constrained to give great weight to
the trial court's interpretation of its own judgment."); Auer v. Scott, 494 N.W.2d
54, 58 (Minn. App. 1992) ("generally a trial court's construction of its own decree
is accorded great weight on appeal."); Kosteleckv v. Kostolechy, 537 N.W.2d
551, 553 (N.D. 1995) ("construction of its own decree by the trial court must be
given great weight in determining the intent of the trial court.")(citations omitted);
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See also, Baculis v. Baculis, 430 N.W.2d 399, 404 (Iowa Sup. 1998); Wilde v.
Wilde, 326 P.2d 415, 416 (Nev. 1958). However, a trial court's interpretation of
its own orders is reviewed for correctness. Stevensen v. Goodson. 924 P.2d
339, 346 (Utah 1996).
The trial court's original Order of Sanction imposed "a suspension of one
year in this matter but will stay all but 181 days." (R. at 169). At the Affirmation
Hearing to consider the OPC's request to set aside the reinstatement order, the
trial court stated:
THE COURT: In this matter I - - when I entered this order, the
suspension in this case, it was my intention that the suspension be
for one year and I was staying all but the time. So the suspension
would fall underneath 525. It was my intention that all but six
months - - you would be suspended for six months and a day, and
rather than saying that, I said 181 days, thinking in error that that
was the same thing.
(R. at 558 p.25)

The trial court left little doubt that, in its mind, the suspension

and reinstatement should be carried out pursuant to the requirements of 14-525.
Furthermore, following the Affirmation Hearing the trial court rejected a
proposed order submitted by Rasmussen that included language that the
reinstatement order "was signed consistent with Rule 14-524." (R. at 265). The
March 29, 2011 Affirmation Order ultimately signed by the trial court was
noticeably devoid of any reference to rule 14-524. (R. at 262).
Given the expressed intent of the trial court, as well as the conduct of the
parties in seeking and opposing reinstatement, this Court, if necessary, should

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

find that Rasmussen's reinstatement was governed by the provisions of 14-525,
not 14-524.
C. Because Rasmussen's Reinstatement was Not Governed by 14524, His Proposed Order of Reinstatement was Premature and the
OPC's Objection was Timely.
Rasmussen filed his Verified Petition for Reinstatement on January 24,
2011. At that point the OPC immediately began the process of publishing notice
in the Utah Bar Journal, as required by 14-525, conducting discovery, and
preparing its opposition to the reinstatement based upon information it had
received that Rasmussen had been practicing law while on suspension.
However, prior to the expiration of the 60 days allowed under the rules for the
OPC to object, Rasmussen filed a proposed Order of Reinstatement that was
received by the OPC after the order had already been signed. (R. at 558 p.8).
Noticeably absent from the filing was a Notice to Submit for Decision or any
certification that the OPC had been given the opportunity to review the proposed
order. However, the filing did include a certificate of mailing stating it had been
mailed to the OPC on February 17, 2011, the same day it was delivered to, and
signed by, the trial court. (R. at 213-214).
Aware that by rule it only had five days in which to object to the proposed
order, the OPC mailed its Objection to Order of Reinstatement on February 18,
2011. (R. at 215-218). The objection informed the trial court of the OPC's intent
to more fully oppose Rasmussen's reinstatement within the 60 days allowed by
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14-525. The OPG later learned the trial court signed the Order on February 17,
2011, the same day it received it.3

;

In his response to the OPC's objection, a pleading captioned Reply to
Memorandum In Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V.
Rasmussen, Rasmussen asserted for the very first time that he was pursuing
reinstatement based on the requirements outlined in 14-524 rather than 14-525.
(R. at219)4.
Upon learning that the Order of Reinstatement had already been signed,
and that Rasmussen was claiming reinstatement based on 14-524, the OPC in
its reply memorandum asked the trial court to set aside the Order of
Reinstatement and allow it to proceed under 14-525. (R. at 216)5.
Because the OPC had no indication prior to Rasmussen's "Reply" brief that
he was seeking reinstatement based on 14-524, the ten-day objection period
allowed under the rule should not be a bar to the consideration of the OPC's
objection, which was originally filed under 14-525, and the trial court did not

3

The OPC recognizes that Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
allowing a party five days within which to object to a proposed Order is binding
only on the litigants and does not require the trial court to wait for the expiration
of the objection period before signing the order. See, Henshaw v. Estate of King.
2007 UT App. 378 H 25, 173 P.3d 876.
4
The Record prepared by the trial court assigns numbers 219 - 225 to
Rasmussen's Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of
Thomas V. Rasmussen. The OPC's reply to this memorandum, which follows in
the Record, and which is titled The Office of Professional Conduct's Reply to
Reply to Its Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V.
Rasmussen, is assigned numbers 216 - 227, resulting in partial duplication.
5
See Note 4.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

exceed its jurisdiction when it entertained the motion and granted relief
accordingly.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE
OPPOSITION AS A RULE 60(b) POST-JUDGMENT MOTION.

OPC'S

Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons:... (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment.
The rule is designed to protect against orders and judgments which,
in consideration of numerous, oft times unarticulated, reasons, would bring
about the wrong result.
The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a creature of equity
designed to relieve against the harshness of enforcing a judgment,
which may occur through procedural difficulties, the wrongs of the
opposing party, or misfortunes which prevent the presentation of a
claim or defense. An equity court may exercise wide judicial
discretion in weighing the factors of fairness and public convenience,
and this court on appeal will reverse the trial court only where an
abuse of this discretion is clearly shown.
Bovce v. Bovce, 609 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 1980) (internal citations
omitted).
A. The Trial Court had Discretion to Consider the OPC's Opposition
to the Order of Reinstatement.
In Darrinqton v. Wade. 812 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1991), the Court of
Appeals reviewed a trial court's decision to set aside a judgment where the
impetus was not a properly styled rule 60(b) motion but, as in the present case,
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an objection to a proposed order of judgment. In Partington, the defendant had
repeatedly failed to cooperate in discovery, resulting in the plaintiff moving for
sanctions to strike the answer and enter a default judgment.
granted the motion and entered a default.

The trial court

However, the default signed by the

judge, which was to be for liability only, included an amount for damages contrary
to the trial court's instructions. Upon motion from the defendant, the trial court
set aside the default and reopened discovery. After additional failures on the part
of the defendant to cooperate, the plaintiff again moved to strike the answer and
have the court enter a default judgment.
The trial court again granted the motion for default on liability only.
However, when the plaintiff submitted the proposed order it again included an
amount for damages. The defendant filed an objection to the proposed order,
but as in the present case, the court signed the order without seeing the
objection. In supplemental memoranda the defendant argued that the proposed
order went beyond the scope of the court's oral order and also argued that his
conduct did not warrant entry of a default judgment.

Persuaded by the

arguments, the trial court again set aside the judgment.
On appeal the plaintiff argued it was improper for the trial court to set aside
the judgment because the defendant never filed a proper rule 60(b) motion
asking it to do so. The appellate court found that "although [Defendant] never
filed a formal motion asking the court to set aside the default judgment, as
required by Rule 60(b), they did file a timely objection to the proposed order
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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prepared by [Plaintiffs] counsel."

Id. at 457. Additionally, the appellate court

found that defendant's objection, "though clearly mislabeled, was the functional
equivalent of a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment."

And, "most

importantly, the trial court treated it as such a motion." Jd. Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court for
considering the motion.
In the present case, the trial court granted partial relief from the
reinstatement order pursuant to a post-judgment motion filed by the OPC styled
"Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement

of Thomas V.

Rasmussen." As was the case in Darrinqton, the order sought to be set aside
was signed before the objection came to the attention of the trial court.
Therefore, as a practical matter, it would be unreasonable to require the OPC to
style its motion as a rule 60(b) post-judgment motion when at the time the motion
was filed it did not even know the Order it was opposing had already been
signed.

And despite the OPC's failure to caption its motion as a rule 60(b)

motion, it was well within the discretion of the trial court to consider it as such.
Of note in the Darrinqton case is the appellate court's statement that, "we
view [Plaintiff's] argument largely as an attempt to circumvent the merits of
[Defendant's] assertions by elevating form over substance." jd. This is strikingly
similar to the present case where Rasmussen, who has admitted to practicing
law while on suspension, seeks to avoid the consequences of his conduct by
attempting to elevate the form of the OPC's objection over the substance.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Rasmussen cites extensively to this Court's decision in Workers Comp.
Fund v. Argonaut Ins. Co.. 2011 UT 61, 266 P.3d 792, in support of his argument
that the trial court should not have considered the OPC's Opposition to Order of
Reinstatement as a rule 59 or rule 60(b) post-judgment motion. (Aplt. Br. at 3334).

Rasmussen contends that because the OPC did not caption its motion as

such, or specifically cite to either rule in the body of the motion, the trial court
should not have entertained it or granted the post-judgment relief. Rasmussen
misunderstands the holding in Argonaut.
This Court, in Argonaut, reaffirmed its position as stated in Gillett v. Price,
2006 UT 24, 135 P.3d 861, that for rule 59 motions, "the form of a motion does
matter" and that "post judgment motions to reconsider and other similarly titled
motions will not toll the time for appeal." Argonaut, fl 11. The Court in Argonaut
then expanded the Gillett rationale to include rule 60(b) motions and again
articulated that "the form of a rule 60(b) motion does matter." Id. fl 13. Because
Argonaut could not have been construed to have filed either a rule 59 or rule
60(b) motion in compliance with the form requirements, this Court refused to
consider Argonaut's appeal because it lacked jurisdiction.
What Rasmussen fails to recognize is that the Gillett and Argonaut
standards raising form over substance would apply to the present case only if the
trial court had refused to entertain

the OPC's

Opposition to Order of

Reinstatement, and if the OPC appealed that decision to this Court. This Court
would then predictably dismiss the OPC's appeal because its post-judgment
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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motion was not properly captioned pursuant to Argonaut, and thus unable to
confer jurisdiction in the appellate court.

However, that is not what occurred.

The trial court exercised it discretion to entertain the motion and then granted
relief accordingly. Thus, the question of whether the OPC's motion would have
extended the time for appeal as a rule 59 motion, or whether denial of the motion
would have been appealable as a rule 60(b) motion, is moot and Argonaut is
inapplicable.
Rasmussen seeks to expand the holding in Argonaut to not only foreclose
appeals based on inadequately captioned post-judgment motions, but to prohibit
trial courts from even considering such motions. The Argonaut court specifically
declined to adopt such a broad application:
We pause to note that district courts have broad discretion in
determining whether to construe a motion under rule 59 or rule 60(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and nothing in our decision
today precludes a district court from exercising that discretion.
However, if a motion is not captioned as a rule 59 or rule 60(b)
motion and does not cite to rule 59 or rule 60(b), a district court does
not err in failing to construe it as such.
]d. fn 5. Thus, if in exercising its broad discretion, the trial court refused to
consider the OPC's post-judgment motion, the OPC would lack sufficient grounds
for an appeal. However, Argonaut makes clear it was not improper for the trial
court to entertain the motion and, absent an abuse of discretion, the decision to
do so will not be upset on appeal.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21

B.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Considering the
OPC's Opposition to the Order of Reinstatement.

This Court has made it clear that, "broad discretion is accorded the trial
court in ruling on relief from a judgment; and, this Court will reverse that ruling
only if it is clear the trial court abused its discretion." Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d
1193, 1194 (Utah 1984). See also, Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986) ("the
district court judge is vested with considerable discretion under Rule 60(b) in
granting or denying a motion to set aside a judgment").
"Rule 60(b) is an equitable rule that allows courts to balance the competing
concerns that final judgments should not be lightly disturbed and that unjust
judgments should not be allowed to stand." Robinson v. Bagqett, 2011 UT App.
250, % 24, 263 P.3d 411 (citing Laub v. South Cent. Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304,
1306 (Utah 1982).
This is not a situation where the trial court ruled against the OPC and the
OPC filed a motion requesting the trial court to reconsider its ruling, hoping this
time a decision would come down in its favor. The OPC mailed its Opposition to
Order of Reinstatement on February 18, 2011, the day after Rasmussen
provided it with a copy of the proposed Order. At that time the OPC did not know
that the trial court had already signed the Order.
Thus, the OPC's opposition to what it believed was a proposed order,
necessarily converted to a post-judgment motion to have the order set aside. At
that point, it was logical for the trial court to consider the merits of the arguments
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made in the opposition brief and determine whether they justified setting aside or
otherwise modifying the order. This is the very purpose of a rule 60(b) motion.
In evaluating whether to entertain the OPC's motion to set aside the
reinstatement order and permit a hearing on Rasmussen's alleged violation of
the suspension, the trial court likely considered: (1) the circumstances under
which the Order of Reinstatement was signed; (2) whether the reinstatement was
governed by 14-524 or 14-525; (3) whether it was reasonable for Rasmussen to
assume the original suspension was for less than six months; (4) whether it was
reasonable for the OPC to conclude the original suspension was for more than
six months; and (5) whether its original Order of Sanctions included errors that
led to the confusion among the parties.
Clearly, after considering the issues before it the trial court determined, in
its discretion, that it would be proper to entertain the merits of the OPC's motion
and, notwithstanding its prior order that Rasmussen be reinstated, hear evidence
that he had violated the terms of his suspension.
Rasmussen argues that the OPC was not entitled to post-judgment relief
under rule 59 or rule 60 because the evidence the OPC presented regarding
Rasmussen's practice of law while on suspension did not meet the criteria of
"newly discovered" evidence under either subsection (a)(4) of rule 59 or
subsection (b)(2) of rule 60. (Aplt. Br. at 36-37). However, Rasmussen fails to
recognize the broad discretion inherent in subsection (b)(6) of rule 60 that allows
a trial court to relieve a party for "any other reason justifying relief from the
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operation of the judgment." The trial court signed the Order of Reinstatement
prior to receiving the OPC's objection. Upon receiving the objection, the trial
court learned for the first time that Rasmussen may have violated the terms of his
suspension by continuing to practice law. The trial court properly exercised its
discretion in finding that this information justified partial relief from the operation
of the order.
C.

The Signing of the Reinstatement Order was the Result of
Mistakes, Assumptions and Miscommunications.

"The provisions of Rule 60(b)(7) are sufficiently broad to permit the court to
set aside its former order which appeared to have been entered upon an
erroneous assumption and to enter a new order based upon the record before it."
Stewart v. Sullivan, 506 P.2d 74, 76 (Utah 1973).
The trial court's signing of the Order of Reinstatement was the culmination
of several mistakes, assumptions and miscommunications by all the parties
involved. These circumstances provide the context as to why it was appropriate
for the trial court to exercise its broad discretion in construing the OPC's
objection as a post-judgment motion, addressing the merits of the motion, and in
allowing the OPC to present evidence of Rasmussen's violation of his
suspension order in a subsequent hearing.
The mistakes leading up to the signing of the Order of Reinstatement can
be briefly summarized as follows: First, the trial court mistakenly stated in its
original Order of Sanctions that the length of the un-stayed portion of
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Rasmussen's suspension was for 181 days, rather than stating it was for six
months and a day, which was the court's intent. Second, Rasmussen mistakenly
assumed his suspension was for less than six months, and therefore that his
reinstatement was governed by 14-524. Third, Rasmussen failed to provide the
OPC five days within which to object to the proposed Order of Reinstatement
before submitting it to the trial court.

Fourth, the trial court and the OPC

miscommunicated about whether the OPC intended to object to the proposed
reinstatement order.
The trial court admitted it was error for the original sanctions order to
characterize the suspension as being for 181 days, rather than six months and a
day. (R. at 558, p25 and 27).

At the Affirmation Hearing, the trial court

acknowledged this problem:
THE COURT: So your position is, is that the Court's ruling of 181
days, which the Court thought up as being six months and a day,
meaning more than six months, it is defective in saying 181 days
was an error, and the Court made the error, and you relied upon that
error, and therefore you should fall under the 524; is that what you're
saying?
MR. RASMUSSEN: Well, I am saying that I relied on paragraph 1,
and I can see where in the preamble to the four conditions entered
in the Court's order that it says that it's a suspension for one year;
but it also talks about staying all but 181 days. Then when it further
references, by the end of the 181 day suspension, I was led to
believe and relied on the fact that the suspension would only be in
actual time a 181 day suspension.
(R. at 558 p.23-24).
THE COURT: So the question now comes down to the fact is, is that
based upon the Court's decision in this matter in a ruling, order that
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was entered in this case, and not being clear, that whether or not Mr.
Rasmussen is allowed to rely upon that, comply with what the Court
said he had to do to be reinstated and file the necessary documents.
(R. at 558 p.25). Because Rasmussen relied on his interpretation that he was
applying for reinstatement following a suspension of less than six months, the
trial court, in its March 29, 2011, Affirmation Order gave him the benefit of his
interpretation and refused to set aside the Order of Reinstatement. However,
because the OPC relied on its interpretation that Rasmussen was applying for
reinstatement following a suspension of more than six months, the trial court
appears to have given it the benefit of its interpretation by subsequently allowing
the OPC to present the evidence it would have been allowed to submit in a 14525 reinstatement hearing.
Given the trial court's admission that the reinstatement order was
improperly worded, fostering the divergent interpretations by the parties, it was a
proper, if not exemplary, use of the trial court's discretion to allow both parties the
benefit of their interpretation while at the same time carrying out its duty to
ensure that the underlying disciplinary matter was administered in "the interests
of the public, the courts, and the legal profession." RLDD Rule 14-501 (d).
D. The Doctrine of Res Judicata Did Not Bar The Trial Court's
Consideration of Evidence that Rasmussen Continued to Practice
Law While on Suspension.
Rasmussen argues the trial court was precluded by res judicata from
considering evidence of his violations at the Motions Hearing. (Aplt. Br. at 29).
As noted by Rasmussen, the doctrine of res judicata "means that neither of the
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parties can again litigate that claim, demand or cause of action or any issue,
point or part thereof which he could have but failed to litigate in the former
action." Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1981).
The doctrine of res judicata has two branches, claim preclusion and issue
preclusion. See, Murdock v. Sprinqville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39, 982 P.2d 65. It
is unclear from Rasmussen's brief upon which of these two distinct branches he
is relying. However, because each branch has a requirement that the claim or
issue must have been actually addressed in the prior proceeding, Rasmussen's
argument fails under either branch.
For claim preclusion to apply, Rasmussen must establish that:
"(i) both cases must involve the same parties, their privies or
assigns; (ii) the claim sought to be barred either must have been
presented or have been available to be presented in the first case;
and (iii) the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the
merits."
jd- at 1j 16. As will be discussed below, Rasmussen has failed to establish
that the second element of this doctrine has been satisfied. The issue of whether
Rasmussen continued to practice law while on suspension was not presented,
nor was it available to be presented, to the trial court at the Affirmation Hearing.
The four elements of the other branch of res judicata, issue preclusion,
are:
(i) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have
been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii)
the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the
one presented in the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27

must have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first
suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
jd. Again, Rasmussen has failed to show that the issue of his continued
practice of law while on suspension was "completely, fully, and fairly litigated" in
the Affirmation Hearing, and therefore, he is unable to invoke this doctrine as a
bar to the trial court's consideration of this issue at the subsequent Motion
Hearing.
Rasmussen's position is apparently based on (1) the fact that the OPC had
obtained evidence of Rasmussen's improper conduct prior to the Affirmation
Hearing and (2) the OPC's statement to the trial court at the Affirmation Hearing
that it had such information. (Aplt. Br. at 30).
As with his after-the-fact

attempts

to characterize

his petition for

reinstatement as being pursuant to a more favorable rule, Rasmussen is now
attempting an after-the-fact re-characterization of the nature and purpose of the
Affirmation Hearing in order to invoke a favorable doctrine.
The trial court signed Rasmussen's Order of Reinstatement as a result of a
miscommunication between the trial court and the OPC that led the trial court to
believe the OPC would not oppose the order. (R. at 558, p.25-27). However, as
noted above, the OPC had already begun the process of opposing reinstatement,
and was unaware that Rasmussen was seeking reinstatement based upon a rule
that neither the OPC nor the trial court believed was applicable. Once it learned
the proposed order had been sent to the trial court, the OPC immediately
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opposed the order, not knowing the trial court had signed it the same day. As a
result, the OPC requested in its reply brief that the trial court set aside the Order
of Reinstatement. This request is what prompted the trial court to hold the
Affirmation Hearing on March 8, 2011.
Thus, the issue before the trial court at the Affirmation Hearing was not
whether Rasmussen had continued to practice law while on suspension, but
rather would the trial court set aside the Order of Reinstatement, based on the
OPC's argument that Rasmussen's petition was premature, and would the trial
court allow the OPC to present evidence of Rasmussen's violations at a
subsequent hearing. It was this specific request for relief that was ruled upon by
the trial court:
THE COURT: The question is, is should the Court now set aside that
order. Well, I think in the interest of fair play and equity, I don't think
I can. I think that the Court made an error here, wasn't clear in its
order. I said 181 days; 181 days passed, and Mr. Rasmussen
submitted the order to the Court and the Court signed it.
I think that if there's any problems with what he's done during that
181 days, certainly the OPC has the right to come back before the
Court here and see if he violated the conditions of his suspension,
and the Court then can entertain whether or not there should be
another charge Mr. Rasmussen or an additional period of
suspension ordered in this case. So that would be the order. Mr.
Walker, would you prepare that for me, please.
(R. at 558 p. 27).
Contrary to Rasmussen's assertions, the issue of his continued practice of
law during the term of his suspension was not litigated in connection with the
Affirmation Hearing. Additionally, res judicata's bar of issues that should have
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been litigated in the initial proceeding is equally inapplicable. The Affirmation
Hearing was not intended to include the OPC's grounds for opposing the
reinstatement. Its purpose was to determine if the OPC would be allowed to later
present such grounds. The trial court ruled that it would. This evidence was
ultimately brought before the trial court at the Motions Hearing, considered for the
first time, and resulted in Rasmussen's disbarment.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE PROPER ANALYSIS IN
DETERMINING THAT DISBARMENT WAS THE PROPER SANCTION
FOR RASMUSSEN'S VIOLATION OF THE SUSPENSION ORDER.
A. Rasmussen's Sanction for Practicing Law While Suspended Must Be
More Severe than the Original Sanction.
The Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") Rule 14-

606(a) provides that, "the district court or Supreme Court may impose further
sanctions upon a lawyer who violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order." This
Court has stated that "to serve as an effective deterrent for further misconduct,
the penalty for violating an order of suspension must be more severe than the
original suspension." In re Discipline of Doncouse, 2004 UT 77 ^J 19, 99 P.3d
837.

.
In the original sanctions order Rasmussen was suspended for one year

with all but 181 days stayed. While he admits he continued to practice law during
his suspension, he argues the sanction for his conduct should simply be to lift the
stay and impose the entire one year suspension. However, the Court's language
in In re Discipline of Crawley, 2007 UT 44 fl 24, 164 P.3d 1232, would suggest
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that, when considering a higher level of sanction, the trial court should impose an
increase from the entire length of the original suspension, not just the un-stayed
portion.
Although [the attorney's] sanction in this matter should be more
severe than the stayed suspension that he violated, we decline to
impose a more severe sanction now because the OPC did not
appeal on this issue. We thus uphold the sanction imposed by the
district court of a one-year suspension with leave to petition the court
for probation. But we put the bar and bench on notice that less
severe terms of suspension and probation are inappropriate
sanctions for an attorney who violates the terms of an existing
suspension or probation.
In Crawley, the trial court imposed a one-year suspension after the
attorney was found to have practiced law during the six month un-stayed portion
of a two year suspension.
In the present case, the trial court properly followed this Court's direction to
impose a more severe penalty for violating the terms of the suspension, and
properly exercised its discretion in determining that Rasmussen's conduct
warranted disbarment.
Rasmussen argues that his discipline should be governed by RLDD rule
14-605, rather than 14-606. (Aplt. Br. at 40).

While rule 14-605 articulates the

sanctions that are "generally appropriate" for various types of conduct,6 rule 14606 sets forth the principles that "generally apply" in cases involving prior
discipline. Rule 14-606 reads as follows:

6

Rule 14-605 outlines the elements generally required to impose the sanctions of
disbarment, suspension, reprimand and admonition.
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Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the
factors set out in Rule 14-604,[7] the following principles generally apply in
cases involving prior discipline.
(a) The district court or Supreme Court may impose further sanctions upon
a lawyer who violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order.
(b) When a lawyer engages in misconduct similar to that for which the
lawyer has previously been disciplined, the appropriate sanction will
generally be one level more severe than the sanction the lawyer previously
received, provided that the harm requisite for the higher sanction is
present.
The exact basis for Rasmussen's argument that the rule governing prior
discipline orders should not apply to his violation of a prior discipline order is
unclear. He seems to rely on subparagraph (b) for his argument that disbarment
is only an appropriate next level of discipline if the conduct at issue is "similar to
that for which the lawyer

has previously" been suspended.

However,

subparagraph (b) is not a limitation on subparagraph (a), allowing a higher
sanction only for similar conduct, as Rasmussen seems to argue.

Rather,

subparagraph (b) simply provides guidance to a court as to what level of sanction
would be appropriate in situations where an attorney repeats prior misconduct for
which he has already been disciplined. In other words, it would generally be
inappropriate to suspend an attorney for misconduct that is similar to that for
which he was already suspended.

In that case, disbarment would be

7

Rule 14-604 outlines the factors to be considered in imposing sanctions,
namely (a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or
actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence of
aggravating or mitigating factors.
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appropriate. However, it does not follow, as Rasmussen is attempting to argue,
that disbarment is only appropriate in prior discipline cases if the conduct is
similar.
Simply put, the broad language in 14-606(a) permits the court to "impose
further sanctions upon a lawyer who violates the terms of a prior disciplinary
order." The rule inherently accords trial courts discretion in determining the
appropriate sanction for violation of a prior disciplinary order, and if the required
harm is present, all the sanctions in 14-605, including disbarment, are available.
B.

Disbarment is the Appropriate
Analysis.

Sanction

Under a 14-605

Rasmussen argues that if the trial court had analyzed his conduct under
rule 14-605, rather than 14-606, it would have concluded that disbarment was too
harsh of a sanction. (Aplt. Br. at 43). However, as discussed above, the two
rules work hand-in-hand, and because Rasmussen's conduct involves violation
of a prior disciplinary order, rule 14-606 is directly on point.

Nonetheless,

measuring Rasmussen's conduct solely against the guidelines in 14-605 reveals
that sufficient grounds existed for imposing the sanction of disbarment. Rule 14605(a) provides that:
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to
benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and causes serious or
potentially serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or
causes serious or potentially serious interference with a legal
proceeding;...
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In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Disbarment, the
trial court found that Rasmussen "blatantly disregarded the Order of the Court for
his own financial benefit," that his mental state was "the stated need for money,"
and that "there was injury to the public and to the judicial system." (Id).
Measured against the elements of 14-605(a)(1), the trial court's findings support
the sanction of disbarment.
First,

"blatantly

disregarding]"

the

trial court's order

satisfies

the

requirement that the attorney knowingly engage in misconduct as defined in Rule
8.4(d), where it is prejudicial to the administration of justice to disobey an order of
the court. Second, the stated "need for money," satisfies the element that the
conduct be done with the intent to benefit the lawyer. Finally, the trial court found
injury to the public and the judicial system, thus satisfying the final requirement
under 14-605(a) for disbarment.
Notwithstanding that Rasmussen's conduct could be found to justify
disbarment under a strict application of the standards articulated in 14-605, it
cannot be overlooked that he was starting from a point well beyond a mere rule
violation. Rather than impose a "progressive discipline schematic,"8 that takes
into account the fact that he ignored a prior order of discipline, Rasmussen asks
this Court to view his conduct as merely a violation of a court order, the contents
of which are irrelevant.

8

Such an interpretation of the rules is untenable.

Brief of Appellant at 43.
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Rasmussen violated a prior order of discipline.

Under the circumstances, a

"progressive discipline schematic" is mandatory, not discretionary. As previously
noted, this Court "put the bar and bench on notice that less severe terms of
suspension and probation are inappropriate sanctions for an attorney who
violates the terms of an existing suspension or probation." In re Discipline of
Crawley, 2007 UT 441T24, 164 P.3d 1232.
C.

Rasmussen Lied to the Trial Court in the Affidavit He Filed in
Support of His Reinstatement.

Rule 14-605 further provides that disbarment is generally appropriate
where an attorney:
(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the
lawyer's fitness to practice law.
Near the conclusion of the 181 days of his imposed suspension, and in
support of his petition for reinstatement, Rasmussen filed with the trial court the
Affidavit of Thomas V. Rasmussen.

(R. at 207-208).

The only substantive

averment in this affidavit was the following statement: "I have not practiced law
for a total of 181 days up to the time of my anticipated reinstatement in this
matter." (R. at 208 jf 5). However, at the Motions Hearing Rasmussen admitted
to practicing law during the 181 days of his suspension, and the trial court
ultimately found that the affidavit "was not truthful." (R. at 523). In fact, the trial
court found that "Rasmussen made 36 appearances in 17 courts" during the
period of his suspension, and that he "was taking on new matters during his
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suspension." (Jd). Although at the Motions Hearing Rasmussen admitted to
practicing law while suspended, he argued his financial obligations justified his
conduct. (R. at 557, p.15-16). He further attempted to explain the misstatement in
his affidavit by claiming "substantial compliance" based on the fact that he took
on fewer clients and made less money during his suspension that he would have
otherwise.
Rasmussen's dishonesty before the trial court in his sworn affidavit is a
violation under 14-605(a)(3) that would support this Court's conclusion that the
appropriate "more severe" sanction for his conduct is disbarment.
D. The Trial Court Properly Considered Aggravating and Mitigating
Circumstances Associated with Rasmussen's Continued Practice
of Law While on Suspension.
Standards Rule 14-607 instructs that, "after misconduct has been
established, aggravating and mitigating circumstances may be considered and
weighed in deciding what sanction to impose."
In the present case, the trial court stated in its July 18, 2011, Order.
Finally, there are no mitigating circumstances and the aggravating
circumstances are clear. Rasmussen blatantly disregarded the
Order of the Court for his own financial benefit. This violation was
not a single episode but nearly two score.
Rasmussen admitted he continued to practice law while on suspension
because he needed the money.

However, he argues this is evidence of a

"personal or emotional problem," and should be considered a mitigating
circumstance rather than viewed as evidence of a selfish motive. (Aplt. Br. at
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44). Although in a different context, this Court addressed a similar argument, in
In re Discipline of Ennenga, 2001 UT 111, fl 14, 37 P-3d 1150. In Ennenga, the
attorney was found to have misappropriated client funds. At sanctioning, the trial
court "concluded that Ennenga's personal and emotional problems [resulting
from] his inability to meet his regular financial obligations" were mitigating factors.
]d. (quotations and alterations in original).

On appeal, this Court disagreed,

stating, "[although we understand that the pressure of not being able to meet
one's financial obligations can be great, we cannot condone the taking of a
client's money to resolve that problem."

The Court concluded by stating,

"[pjersonal financial pressures cannot mitigate the offense of misappropriation."

id.
Given this Court's interest in protecting the public by regulating those who
may stand before the bar and represent clients, the same rationale considered in
Ennenga should be applied to the present case. Specifically, this Court should
find that, "personal financial pressure cannot mitigate the offense of practicing
law while on suspension. More broadly, it cannot mitigate the offense of blatantly
disregarding an order of the court. The rationale behind not allowing an attorney
to use the need for financial gain as mitigation is especially strong when the
financial pressure is brought about by the attorney's own misconduct. In short,
the trial court properly found that Rasmussen's continued practice of law for the
purpose of making money was an aggravating factor,

not a mitigating

circumstance.
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Rasmussen argues the trial court failed to consider his absence of a prior
record of discipline as a mitigating factor.

Given that Rasmussen was being

sanctioned for violating a prior order of discipline, it is unclear how the trial court
could have considered a lack of prior discipline as a mitigating circumstance.
Rule 14-607(b)(5) allows the trial court to consider as mitigation, "full and
free disclosure to the...disciplinary authority prior to the discovery of any
misconduct or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings." Rasmussen argues
the trial court should have taken into account that he "took full responsibility and
freely disclosed his conduct to the court, maintaining a cooperative attitude
toward the proceedings." (Aplt. Br. at 45). The trial court became aware that
Rasmussen was continuing to represent clients, in violation of his suspension
order, because the OPC, not Rasmussen, brought his conduct to light.
Furthermore, Rasmussen submitted a false affidavit to the trial court averring that
he had not practiced law during the period of his suspension. Again, it is unclear
how the trial court could have considered this to be a mitigating circumstance.
Rasmussen next asserts the trial court should have considered the OPC's
delay in presenting the evidence of his unauthorized practice of law as a
mitigating

circumstance

pursuant

to rule

14-607(b)(10).

(Id.)

This

rule

encompasses delays in disciplinary proceedings that prejudice an attorney's right
to have their case heard expeditiously. Rasmussen is apparently referring to the
fact the OPC waited until after he filed his petition for reinstatement before
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bringing allegations that he violated the terms of his suspension. This is simply
not the type of delay contemplated by the rule.
As an additional mitigating circumstance, Rasmussen argues that the trial
court should have considered, as "interim reform" under 14-607(b)(11), that he
ceased his unauthorized practice of law after receiving the OPC's December
warning letter. Rasmussen did not "reform" his behavior.

He merely stopped

violating the trial court's order after learning that he had been caught. The trial
court was correct in not considering this as mitigation.
Next, Rasmussen contends that the $2000 in sanctions he paid to the
Seventh District Court should be considered as mitigation under rule 14607(b)(12). (jd.). However, those sanctions were imposed by a different trial court
as a result of his conduct which eventually gave rise to the initial suspension. (R.
at 272). The $2,000 sanction was unrelated to the suspension or the disbarment
proceedings. Thus, it would be inappropriate for the trial court to consider it as
mitigation.
Finally, Rasmussen asserts that the remorse he conveyed at the Motions
Hearing should have been considered as mitigation pursuant to rule 14607(b)(13). (Aplt. Br. at 45). In the words of this Court, "[Rasmussen's] remorse
at trial is irrelevant." In re Discipline of Tanner, 960 P.2d 399, 403 (Utah 1998).
The Tanner court went on to explain:
Naturally, anyone going through a trial for the above wrongdoing
would feel remorse after getting caught. Instead, the remorse
question closely relates to acknowledgment of wrongful conduct: did
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I

Tanner feel remorse about his behavior before getting caught, and
was he motivated by remorse in making amends?
]d. (Emphasis in original).
In sum, the trial court properly considered any aggravating and mitigating
circumstances that were properly before it in determining that disbarment was
the appropriate sanction for Rasmussen's violation of the order of suspension.
E. THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S
IMPOSITION OF THE SANCTION OF DISBARMENT.
In recent years this Court has considered other cases addressing the issue
of progressive sanctions in attorney discipline matters.

In In re Discipline of

Doncouse. 2004 UT 77, 99 P.3d 837, an attorney was suspended for three years
after it was found he violated the terms of a ninety-day suspension. However, in
In re Johnson, 830 P.2d 262 (Utah 1992), this Court ordered disbarment where
an attorney violated a six month suspension. The difference between the two
cases is the extent to which the attorneys continued to practice law while on
suspension. As will be shown, Rasmussen's conduct is more analogous to the
violations of the attorney disbarred in Johnson.9
The attorney in In re Johnson, was originally suspended for six months for
violating the terms of a prior probation.

During the course of the six month

9

This issue was also addressed in the consolidated case of In re Discipline of
Crawley. 2007 UT 44, 164 P.3d 1232, where an attorney violated the terms of a
suspension. This Court declined to impose a sanction more severe than the one
year suspension imposed by the district court because the OPC failed to appeal
the issue.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4D

suspension, the OPC continued to receive complaints, and it was eventually
determined that, while suspended, the attorney accepted new clients, provided
legal advice to clients, held himself out as one authorized to practice law, and
received compensation from his firm,

id- at 263.

This Court found that the

attorney "continued to practice law in flagrant disregard of this court's order of
suspension." Jd. As a result, the attorney was disbarred. ]d. at 264.
By contrast, the attorney in In re Discipline of Doncouse, 2004 UT 77, 99
P.3d 837, was found to have practiced law on just three occasions during the
course of a ninety-day suspension. After considering mitigating and aggravating
factors, the trial court suspended the attorney for one year. The OPC appealed,
arguing the attorney should be disbarred. After reviewing the standards for
imposing sanctions, this Court noted that the distinction between disbarment and
suspension "lies, in part, in the attorney's motive and in the relative severity of
the conduct." id-at 1116.
In that case, the attorney's practice of law while on suspension was limited
to identifying himself as an attorney in order to access a client in prison, filing a
reply memorandum on behalf of a client, and accepting a new client in a matter,
id. at 1|7. This Court found the attorney's actions were not egregious enough, and
that the level of injury was not severe enough, to warrant disbarment, id at 1J16.
It distinguished the Johnson case, noting the attorney there "essentially ignored
the imposition of sanctions and continued] with business as usual." id. at 1J17
However, in Doncouse, this Court did increase the length of the suspension from
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one year to three, stating that, "to serve as an effective deterrent for further
misconduct, the penalty for violating an order of suspension must be more
severe than the original suspension." Id. at fl19.
In the present case, Rasmussen made 36 court appearances and filed 17
pleadings. (R. at 251, 258-259). He not only continued representing his existing
clients, he took on new matters as well. And his admitted motivation for violating
the court's order was the need for money. As with the attorney in Johnson,
Rasmussen "essentially ignored the imposition of sanctions and continued] with
business as usual." Notwithstanding his argument that he took on fewer matters
than he otherwise would during the six months of his suspension, it is undisputed
that Rasmussen continued to practice law in violation of the courts order and that
his violations were numerous. As such, the trial court correctly imposed the
sanction of disbarment.
CONCLUSION
Rasmussen's suspension was for a period greater than six months, and
therefore, his reinstatement was governed by the provisions of RLDD 14-525.
Thus, the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction by entertaining the OPC's
objection that was filed more than ten days after Rasmussen's petition for
reinstatement.
The trial court had discretion to consider the OPC's Opposition to Order of
Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen as a post-judgment motion pursuant to
rule 60(b), and discretion to grant the relief requested in the motion. Because the
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issue of Rasmussen's violation of the terms of his suspension was not addressed
in the Affirmation Hearing, the doctrine of res judicata did not prevent the trial
court from considering the evidence at the Motions Hearing.
Rasmussen's sanction for violating the terms of his suspension should be
more severe than the original suspension of one year. The trial court correctly
weighed aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and properly ruled that the
appropriate sanction for Rasmussen's violation of the terms of his suspension
was disbarment.
DATED: August 2, 2012.

OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

rSdd Wahlquist \ y
Deputy Senior Counsel
OFFICE OF PROFEESSIONAL CONDUCT
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Senior Counsel
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Rules of Central Importance Cited in the Brief
Rule 14-601. Definitions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
As used in this article:
(a) "complainant" means the person who files an informal complaint or the O P C
when the OPC determines to open an investigation based on information it has
received;
(b) "formal complaint" means a complaint filed in the district court alleging
misconduct by a lawyer or seeking the transfer of a lawyer to disability status;
(c) "informal complaint" means any written, notarized allegation of misconduct by
or incapacity of a lawyer;
(d) "injury" means harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession
which results from a lawyers misconduct. The level of injury can range from
"serious" injury to "little or no" injury; a reference to "injury" alone indicates any
level of injury greater than "little or no" injury;
(e) "intent" means the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result;
(f) "knowledge" means the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant
circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to
accomplish a particular result;
(g) "negligence" means the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that
circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from
the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation;
(h) "potential injury" means the harm to a client, the public, the legal system or
the profession that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the lawyer's
misconduct, and which, but for some intervening factor or event, would probably
have resulted from the lawyer's misconduct;
(i) "respondent" means a lawyer subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court against whom an informal or formal complaint has been filed; and
(j) "Rules of Professional Conduct" means the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct (including the accompanying comments) initially adopted by the
Supreme Court in 1988, as amended from time to time.
Rule 14-602. Purpose and Nature of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions.
(a) Summary. This article is based on the Black Letter Rules contained in the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions prepared by the American Bar
Association's Center for Professional Responsibility. They have been
substantially revised by the Supreme Court. Notably, ABA Standards 4 through 8
have been reduced into a single Rule 14-605.
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(b) Purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings. The purpose of imposing lawyer
sanctions is to ensure and maintain the high standard of professional conduct
required of those who undertake the discharge of professional responsibilities as
lawyers, and to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers
who have demonstrated by their conduct that they are unable or likely to be
unable to discharge properly their professional responsibilities.
(c) Public nature of lawyer discipline proceedings. Ultimate disposition of lawyer
discipline shall be public in cases of disbarment, suspension, and reprimand, and
nonpublic in cases of admonition.
(d) Purpose of these rules. These rules are designed for use in imposing a
sanction or sanctions following a determination that a member of the legal
profession has violated a provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Descriptions in these rules of substantive disciplinary offenses are not intended
to create grounds for determining culpability independent of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. The rules constitute a system for determining sanctions,
permitting flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions in particular cases of
lawyer misconduct. They are designed to promote:
(d)(1) consideration of all factors relevant to imposing the appropriate level of
sanction in an individual case;
(d)(2) consideration of the appropriate weight of such factors in light of the stated
goals of lawyer discipline; and
(d)(3) consistency in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or
similar offenses within and among jurisdictions.
Rule 14-603. Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
(a) Scope. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or
acknowledgement that the lawyer has engaged in professional misconduct.
(b) Disbarment. Disbarment terminates the individual's status as a lawyer. A
lawyer who has been disbarred may be readmitted as provided in Rule 14-525.
(c) Suspension. Suspension is the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law
for a specified minimum period of time. Generally, suspension should be
imposed for a specific period of time equal to or greater than six months, but in
no event should the time period prior to application for reinstatement be more
than three years.
(c)(1) A lawyer who has been suspended for six months or less may be
reinstated as set forth in Rule 14-524.
(c)(2) A lawyer who has been suspended for more than six months may
be reinstated as set forth in Rule 14-525.
(d) Interim suspension. Interim suspension is the temporary suspension of a
lawyer from the practice of law. Interim suspension may be imposed as set forth
in Rules 14-518 and 14-519.
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(e) Reprimand. Reprimand is public discipline which declares the conduct of the
lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice.
(f) Admonition. Admonition is nonpublic discipline which declares the conduct of
the lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice.
(g) Probation. Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under
specified conditions. Probation can be public or nonpublic, can be imposed alone
or in conjunction with other sanctions, and can be imposed as a condition of
readmission or reinstatement.
(h) Resignation with discipline pending. Resignation with discipline pending is a
form of public discipline which allows a respondent to resign from the practice of
law while either an informal or formal complaint is pending against the
respondent. Resignation with discipline pending may be imposed as set forth in
Rule 14-521
(i) Other sanctions and remedies. Other sanctions and remedies which may be
imposed include:
(i)(1) restitution;
(i)(2) assessment of costs;
(i)(3) limitation upon practice;
(i)(4) appointment of a receiver;
(i)(5) a requirement that the lawyer take the Bar Examination or
professional responsibility examination; and
(i)(6) a requirement that the lawyer attend continuing education courses.
(j) Reciprocal discipline. Reciprocal discipline is the imposition of a disciplinary
sanction on a lawyer who has been disciplined in another court, another
jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction.
Rule 14-604. Factors to be Considered in Imposing Sanctions, Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
The following factors should be considered in imposing a sanction after a finding
of lawyer misconduct:
(a) the duty violated;
(b) the lawyer's mental state;
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.
Rule 14-605. Imposition of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions.
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Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors
set out in Rule 14-604, the following sanctions are generally appropriate.
(a) Disbarment. Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to
benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and causes serious
or potentially serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or
causes serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding;
or
(a)(2) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which
includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or
the sale, distribution, or importation of controlled substances; or the
intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of
another to commit any of these offenses; or
(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the
lawyer's fitness to practice law.
(b) Suspension. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(b)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes
injury or potential injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or
causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b)(2) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements
listed in Rule 14-605(a)(2) but nevertheless seriously adversely reflects on
the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
(c) Reprimand. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(c)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes
injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference
with a legal proceeding; or
(c)(2) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's
fitness to practice law.
(d) Admonition. Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(d)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes little
or no injury to a party, the public, or the legal system or interference with a
legal proceeding, but exposes a party, the public, or the legal system to
potential injury or causes potential interference with a legal proceeding; or
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(d)(2) engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise identified in
this rule that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
Rule 14-606. Prior Discipline Orders, Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions.
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors
set out in Rule 14-604, the following principles generally apply in cases involving
prior discipline.
(a) The district court or Supreme Court may impose further sanctions upon a
lawyer who violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order.
(b) When a lawyer engages in misconduct similar to that for which the lawyer has
previously been disciplined, the appropriate sanction will generally be one level
more severe than the sanction the lawyer previously received, provided that the
harm requisite for the higher sanction is present.
Rule 14-607. Aggravation and Mitigation, Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions.
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating
circumstances may be considered and weighed in deciding what sanction to
impose.
(a) Aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances are any
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline
to be imposed. Aggravating circumstances may include:
(a)(1) prior record of discipline;
(a)(2) dishonest or selfish motive;
(a)(3) a pattern of misconduct;
(a)(4) multiple offenses;
(a)(5) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to
comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority;
(a)(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive
practices during the disciplinary process;
(a)(7) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct
involved, either to the client or to the disciplinary authority;
(a)(8) vulnerability of victim;
(a)(9) substantial experience in the practice of law;
(a)(10) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of the misconduct involved; and
(a)(11) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances.
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(b) Mitigating circumstances. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or
factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed.
Mitigating circumstances may include:
(b)(1) absence of a prior record of discipline;
(b)(2) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(b)(3) personal or emotional problems;
(b)(4) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of the misconduct involved;
(b)(5) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior
to the discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings;
(b)(6) inexperience in the practice of law;
(b)(7) good character or reputation;
(b)(8) physical disability;
(b)(9) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when:
(b)(9)(A) the respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental
disability; and
(b)(9)(B) the substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to
the misconduct; and
(b)(9)(C) the respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental
disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of
successful rehabilitation; and
(b)(9)(D) the recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that
misconduct is unlikely;
(b)(10) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided that the
respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and provided
further that the respondent has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the
delay;
(b)(11) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental disability or
impairment;
(b)(12) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
(b)(13) remorse; and
(b)(14) remoteness of prior offenses.
(c) Other circumstances. The following circumstances should not be considered
as either aggravating or mitigating:
(c)(1) forced or compelled restitution;
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(c)(2) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;
(c)(3) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings;
(c)(4) complainant's recommendation as to sanction; and
(c)(5) failure of injured client to complain.
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Rule 14-501. Purpose, authority, scope and structure of lawyer
disciplinary and disability proceedings.
(a) The purpose of lawyer disciplinary and disability proceedings is to ensure and
maintain the high standard of professional conduct required of those who
undertake the discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers and to protect
the public and the administration of justice from those who have demonstrated by
their conduct that they are unable or unlikely to properly discharge their
professional responsibilities.
(b) Under Article VIII, Section 4 of the Constitution of Utah, the Utah Supreme
Court has exclusive authority within Utah to adopt and enforce rules governing
the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to practice law.
(c) All disciplinary proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with this article
and Article 6, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. Formal disciplinary and
disability proceedings are civil in nature. These rules shall be construed so as to
achieve substantial justice and fairness in disciplinary matters with dispatch and
at the least expense to all concerned parties.
(d) The interests of the public, the courts, and the legal profession all require that
disciplinary proceedings at all levels be undertaken and construed to secure the
just and speedy resolution of every complaint.
Rule 14-509. Grounds for discipline.
It shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer to:
(a) violate the Rules of Professional Conduct;
(b) willfully violate a valid order of a court or a screening panel imposing
discipline;
(c) be publicly disciplined in another jurisdiction;
(d) fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 14-526(e); or
(e) fail to notify the OPC of public discipline in another jurisdiction in accordance
with Rule 14-522(a).
Rule 14-511. Proceedings subsequent to finding of probable cause.
(a) Commencement of action. If the screening panel finds probable cause to
believe that there are grounds for public discipline and that a formal complaint is
merited, OPC counsel shall prepare and file with the district court a formal
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complaint setting forth in plain and concise language the facts upon which the
charge of unprofessional conduct is based and the applicable provisions of the
Rules of Professional Conduct The formal complaint shall be signed by the
Committee chair or, in the chair's absence, by the Committee vice chair or a
screening panel chair designated by the Committee chair.
(b) Venue. The action shall be brought and the trial shall be held in the county in
which an alleged offense occurred or in the county where the respondent resides
or practices law or last practiced law in Utah; provided, however, that if the
respondent is not a resident of Utah and the alleged offense is not committed in
Utah, the trial shall be held in a county designated by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court. The parties may stipulate to a change of venue in accordance
with applicable law.
(c) Style of proceedings. All proceedings instituted by the OPC shall be styled "In
the Matter of the Discipline of (name of respondent and respondent's Bar
number), Respondent."
(d) Change of judge as a matter of right.
(d)(1) Notice of change. The respondent or OPC counsel may, by filing a notice
indicating the name of the assigned judge, the date on which the formal
complaint was filed, and that a good faith effort has been made to serve all
parties, change the judge assigned to the case. The notice shall not specify any
reason for the change of judge. The party filing the notice shall send a copy of
the notice to the assigned judge and to the presiding judge. The party filing the
notice may request reassignment to another district court judge from the same
district, which request shall be granted. Under no circumstances shall more than
one change of judge be allowed to each party under this rule.
(d)(2) Time. Unless extended by the court upon a showing of good cause, the
notice must be filed within 30 days after commencement of the action or prior to
the notice of trial setting, whichever occurs first. Failure to file a timely notice
precludes any change of judge under this rule.
(d)(3) Assignment of action. Upon the filing of a notice of change, the assigned
judge shall take no further action in the case. The presiding judge shall promptly
determine whether the notice is proper and, if so, shall reassign the action. If the
presiding judge is also the assigned judge, the clerk shall promptly send the
notice to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall determine whether
the notice is proper and, if so, shall reassign the action.
(d)(4) Rule 63 and Rule 63A unaffected. This rule does not affect any rights a
party may have pursuant to Rule 63 or Rule 63A of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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(e) Actions tried to the bench; findings and conclusions. All actions tried
according to this article shall be tried to the bench, and the district court shall
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. Neither masters nor commissioners
shall be utilized.
(f) Sanctions hearing. Upon a finding of misconduct and as soon as reasonably
practicable, within a target date of not more than 30 days after the district court
enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law, it shall hold a hearing to receive
relevant evidence in aggravation and mitigation, and shall within five days
thereafter, enter an order sanctioning the respondent. Upon reasonable notice to
the parties, the court, at its discretion, may hold the sanctions hearing
immediately after the misconduct proceeding.
(g) Review. Any discipline order by the district court may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court through a petition for review pursuant to the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedur
Rule14-512. Sanctions.
The imposition of sanctions against a respondent who has been found to have
engaged in misconduct shall be governed by Chapter 14, Article 6, Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions.
Rule 14-524. Reinstatement following a suspension of six months or less.
A respondent who has been suspended for six months or less pursuant to
disciplinary proceedings shall be reinstated at the end of the period of
suspension upon filing with the district court and serving upon OPC counsel an
affidavit stating that the respondent has fully complied with the requirements of
the suspension order and that the respondent has fully reimbursed the Bar's
Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection for any amounts paid on account of the
respondent's conduct. Within ten days, OPC counsel may file an objection and
thereafter the district court shall conduct a hearing.
Rule 14-525. Reinstatement following a suspension of more than six
months; readmission.
(a) Generally. A respondent suspended for more than six months or a disbarred
respondent shall be reinstated or readmitted only upon order of the district court.
No respondent may petition for reinstatement until three months before the
period for suspension has expired. No respondent may petition for readmission
until five years after the effective date of disbarment. A respondent who has been
placed on interim suspension and is then disbarred for the same misconduct that
was the ground for the interim suspension may petition for readmission at the
expiration of five years from the effective date of the interim suspension.
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(b) Petition. A petition for reinstatement or readmission shall be verified, filed with
the district court, and shall specify with particularity the manner in which the
respondent meets each of the criteria specified in paragraph (e) or, if not, why
there is otherwise good and sufficient reason for reinstatement or readmission.
With specific reference to paragraph (e)(4), prior to the filing of a petition for
readmission, the respondent must receive a report and recommendation from the
Bar's Character and Fitness Committee. In addition to receiving the report and
recommendation from the Character and Fitness Committee, the respondent
must satisfy all other requirements as set forth in Article 7, Admissions. Prior to
or as part of the respondent's petition, the respondent may request modification
or abatement of conditions of discipline, reinstatement or readmission.
(c) Service of petition. The respondent shall serve a copy of the petition upon
OPC counsel.
(d) Publication of notice of petition. At the time a respondent files a petition for
reinstatement or readmission, OPC counsel shall publish a notice of the petition
in the Utah Bar Journal. The notice shall inform members of the Bar about the
application for reinstatement or readmission, and shall request that any
individuals file notice of their opposition or concurrence with the district court
within 30 days of the date of publication. In addition, OPC counsel shall notify
each complainant in the disciplinary proceeding that led to the respondent's
suspension or disbarment that the respondent is applying for reinstatement or
readmission, and shall inform each complainant that the complainant has 30
days from the date of mailing to raise objections to or to support the respondent's
petition. Notice shall be mailed to the last known address of each complainant in
OPC counsel's records.
(e) Criteria for reinstatement and readmission. A respondent may be reinstated
or readmitted only if the respondent meets each of the following criteria, or, if not,
presents good and sufficient reason why the respondent should nevertheless be
reinstated or readmitted.
(e)(1) The respondent has fully complied with the terms and conditions of all prior
disciplinary orders except to the extent they are abated by the district court.
(e)(2) The respondent has not engaged nor attempted to engage in the
unauthorized practice of law during the period of suspension or disbarment.
(e)(3) If the respondent was suffering from a physical or mental disability or
impairment which was a causative factor of the respondent's misconduct,
including substance abuse, the disability or impairment has been removed.
Where substance abuse was a causative factor in the respondent's misconduct,
the respondent shall not be reinstated or readmitted unless:
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(e)(3)(A) the respondent has recovered from the substance abuse as
demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation;
(e)(3)(B) the respondent has abstained from the use of the abused substance
and the unlawful use of controlled substances for the preceding six months; and
(e)(3)(C) the respondent is likely to continue to abstain from the substance
abused and the unlawful use of controlled substances.
(e)(4) Notwithstanding the conduct for which the respondent was disciplined, the
respondent has the requisite honesty and integrity to practice law. In readmission
cases, the respondent must appear before the Bar's Character and Fitness
Committee and cooperate in its investigation of the respondent. A copy of the
Character and Fitness Committee's report and recommendation shall be
provided to the OPC and forwarded to the district court assigned to the petition
after the respondent files a petition.
(e)(5) The respondent has kept informed about recent developments in the law
and is competent to practice.
(e)(6) In cases of suspensions for one year or more, the respondent shall be
required to pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination.
(e)(7) In all cases of disbarment, the respondent shall be required to pass the
student applicant Bar Examination and the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Examination.
(e)(8) The respondent has fully reimbursed the Bar's Lawyers' Fund for Client
Protection for any amounts paid on account of the respondent's conduct.
(f) Review of petition. Within 60 days after receiving a respondent's petition for
reinstatement or readmission, OPC counsel shall either:
(f)(1) advise the respondent and the district court that OPC counsel will not object
to the respondent's reinstatement or readmission; or
(f)(2) file a written objection to the petition.
(g) Hearing; report. If an objection is filed by OPC counsel, the district court, as
soon as reasonably practicable and within a target date of 90 days of the filing of
the petition, shall conduct a hearing at which the respondent shall have the
burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent
has met each of the criteria in paragraph (e) or, if not, that there is good and
sufficient reason why the respondent should nevertheless be reinstated or
readmitted. The district court shall enter its findings and order. If no objection is
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filed by OPC counsel, the district court shall review the petition without a hearing
and enter its findings and order.
(h) Successive petitions. Unless otherwise ordered by the district court, no
respondent shall apply for reinstatement or readmission within one year following
an adverse judgment upon a petition for reinstatement or readmission.
(i) Conditions of reinstatement or readmission. The district court may impose
conditions on a respondent's reinstatement or readmission if the respondent has
met the burden of proof justifying reinstatement or readmission, but the district
court reasonably believes that further precautions should be taken to ensure that
the public will be protected upon the respondent's return to practice.
(j) Reciprocal reinstatement or readmission. If a respondent has been suspended
or disbarred solely on the basis of discipline imposed by another court, another
jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction, and if the
respondent is later reinstated or readmitted by that court, jurisdiction or
regulatory body, the respondent may petition for reciprocal reinstatement or
readmission in Utah. The respondent shall file with the district court and serve
upon OPC counsel a petition for reciprocal reinstatement or readmission, as the
case may be. The petition shall include a certified or otherwise authenticated
copy of the order of reinstatement or readmission from the other court,
jurisdiction or regulatory body. Within 20 days of service of the petition, O P C
counsel may file an objection thereto based solely upon substantial procedural
irregularities. If an objection is filed, the district court shall hold a hearing and
enter its finding and order. If no objection is filed, the district court shall enter its
order based upon the petition.
Rule 14-526. Notice of disability or suspension; return of clients' property;
refund of unearned fees.
(a) Effective date of order; winding up affairs. Each order that imposes
disbarment or suspension is effective 30 days after the date of the order, or at
such other time as the order provides. Each order that transfers a respondent to
disability status is effective immediately upon the date of the order, unless the
order otherwise provides. After the entry of any order of disbarment, suspension,
or transfer to disability status, the respondent shall not accept any new retainer
or employment as a lawyer in any new case or legal matter; provided, however,
that during any period between the date of entry of an order and its effective
date, the respondent may, with the consent of the client after full disclosure, wind
up or complete any matters pending on the date of entry of the order.
(b) Notice to clients and others. In every case in which a respondent is disbarred
or suspended for more than six months, the respondent shall, within 20 days of
the entry of the order, accomplish the following acts:
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(b)(1) notify each client and any co-counsel in every pending legal matter,
litigation and non-litigation, that the respondent has been disbarred or suspended
from the practice of law and is disqualified from further participation in the matter;
(b)(2) notify each client that, in the absence of co-counsel, the client should
obtain a new lawyer, calling attention to the urgency to seek new counsel,
particularly in pending litigation;
(b)(3) deliver to every client any papers or other property to which the client is
entitled or, if delivery cannot reasonably be made, make arrangements
satisfactory to the client or co-counsel of a reasonable time and place where
papers and other property may be obtained, calling attention to any urgency to
obtain the same;
(b)(4) refund any part of any fee paid in advance that has not been earned as of
the effective date of the discipline;
(b)(5) in each matter pending before a court, agency or tribunal, notify opposing
counsel or, in the absence of counsel, the adverse party, of the respondent's
disbarment or suspension and consequent disqualification to further participate
as a lawyer in the matter;
(b)(6) file with the court, agency or tribunal before which any matter is pending a
copy of the notice given to opposing counsel or to an adverse party; and
(b)(7) within ten days after the effective date of disbarment or suspension, file an
affidavit with O P C counsel showing complete performance of the foregoing
requirements of this rule. The respondent shall keep and maintain for inspection
by OPC counsel all records of the steps taken to accomplish the requirements of
this rule.
(c) Lien. Any attorney's lien for services rendered which are not tainted by reason
of disbarment or suspension shall not be rendered invalid merely because of the
order of discipline.
(d) Other notice. If a respondent is suspended for six months or less, the district
court may impose conditions similar to those set out in paragraph (b). In any
public disciplinary matter, the district court may also require the issuance of
notice to others as it deems necessary to protect the interests of clients or the
public.
(e) Compliance. Substantial compliance with the provisions of paragraphs (a), (b)
and (d) shall be a precondition for reinstatement or readmission. Willful failure to
comply with paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) shall constitute contempt of court and
may be punished as such or by further disciplinary action.
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is
pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence;
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct
of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable
that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall
be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more
than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment,
order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion
as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

«!S

Addendum D
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FE8 t 7 2011
ML Office of
Professional Conduct

THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN, #2693
4659 So. Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 484-3000
Facsimile: (801) 273-1089

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

:

ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT OF
THOMAS V, RASMUSSEN

Thomas V. Rasmussen, #2693

:

Civil No. 090908841
Judge: L. A. Dever

Based upon Respondent's Verified Petition for Reinstatement
and accompanying documentation, and the fact that more than 181
days from the effective date of the Court's Order of Sanctions,
dated July 20, 2010, has elapsed, and for good cause appearing, it
is hereby;
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, & DECREED, that Thomas V. Rasmussen, #2693,
is hereby Reinstated as an Attorney at Law in good standing in the
State of Utah.
DATED this

day of February, 2011.
BY THE COURT:

J u d g e L . A. DEVER
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed postage pre-paid a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V.
Rasmussen to the Office of Professional Conduct at 645 South 200
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
Dated this

IT

day of February, 2011.

A. L. Zd
Secretary
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FILED
mm DISTRICT COURT

II FEB 18 PM h36
ALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
Billy L. Walker, #3358
Senior Counsel
Utah State Bar
Office of Professional Conduct
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)531-9110

BY.
DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Discipline of:

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT
OF THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN

Thomas V. Rasmussen #02693
Civil No. 090908841
Respondent.
Judge L. A. Dever

The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC"), by and through
Billy L. Walker, Senior Counsel, and in accordance with Rule 14-525 of the Rules of
Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"), hereby objects to Mr. Rasmussen's proposed
Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen ("Order").
ARGUMENT

I.

MR. RASMUSSEN ORDER IS PREMATURE
Rule 14-525(f) RLDD states: "Within 60 days after receiving a respondent's petition

for reinstatement or readmission, OPC counsel shall either (1) advise the respondent and
the district court that OPC counsel will not object to the respondent's reinstatement or
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readmission; or (2) file a written objection to the petition." Mr. Rasmussen filed his Verified
Petition on January 24, 2011 and served the OPC with the Verified Petition on the same
day. Therefore, the OPC has until March 25, 2011 to file its objection, which it intends to
do.
It is apparent that Mr. Rasmussen's intent was to file his petition pursuant to 14-525
of the RLDD because it is verified which is required by 14-525(b) of the rule. Furthermore,
the Court's Order of Sanction was for a suspension of one year which requires a petition to
be filed in accordance with 14-525.
For the Court's information, on February 1, 2011, the OPC sent Interrogatories and
Request for Production of Documents to Mr. Rasmussen with regard to his reinstatement.
Mr. Rasmussen has yet to respond to the discovery requests, however, his responses are
not due until March 2, 2011. The OPC plans to use Mr. Rasmussen's responses to
supplement the objection it will file on or before March 25, 2011. After the OPC files its
objection which will detail the basis for a denial of reinstatement, the Court is required to
hold a hearing pursuant to 14-525(g) of the rule.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Rasmussen's Order is premature and by submitting it to the Court it is the
OPC's viewpoint that Mr. Rasmussen is attempting to bypass Rule 14-525(f) of the RLDD.
Therefore, Mr. Rasmussen's Order should not be signed.
DATED this _ T ? day of February, 2011.

Billy L Walker
Senior Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of February, 2011, I caused to be mailed a
true and correct copy of the Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of
Thomas V. Rasmussen to:
Thomas V. Rasmussen
4659 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

fllfcft"' W\ol
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THOMAS V, RASMUSSEN, #2693
4659 So, Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 484-3000
Facsimile: (801) 273-1089

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

:
:

&EPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO ORDER OF
REINSTATEMENT OF
THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN

Thomas V. Rasmussen, #2693
:

Civil No. 090908841

:

Judge L. A. Dever

Respondent.

OPC's Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of
Thomas V. Rasmussen, is out of order and lacks any legal authority
under

the

Rules

of

Lawyer

Discipline

and

Disability,

completely missed its deadline to object under Rule 14-524*
contrary, this

Court properly and legally

as

it

On the

signed an Order of

Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen on February 17, 2011.

The

Court's action was in full compliance with Rule 14-524, which
reads:
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RULE 14-524.

REINSTATEMENT FOLLOWING A SUSPENSION OF
SIX MONTHS OR LESS

A respondent who has been suspended for six months or
less pursuant to disciplinary proceedings shall be
reinstated at the end of the period of suspension upon
filing with the district court and serving upon OPC
counsel an affidavit stating that the respondent has
fully complied with the requirements of the suspension
order ... . Within ten days, OPC counsel may file an
objection and thereafter the district court shall
conduct a hearing.
The Court's Order of Sanction executed on July 20, 2010, primarily
required

that

Respondent

"enter

and

complete

an

ethics

and

professional conduct course by the end of the 181 day suspension"
and

"not practice

law during

the

[181 day] suspension and so

certify that fact by affidavit", which is the very same requirement
as contained in Rule 14-524.

It is clear on the face of Rule 14-

524 that both the Court and the Respondent have fully complied with
the requirements of the Rule. It is equally apparent that OPC is in
non-compliance with the above-stated Rule, as it filed an objection
to the Court's Order of Reinstatement on or after February 18,
2011, well beyond the 10 days deadline specified in Rule 14-524 for
the filing of an objection by OPC counsel or the granting of a
hearing by the Court.
The timeline below illuminates the analysis and conclusions
mentioned above.
1.

July 20, 2010, Order of Sanction signed by District Court

Judge L. A. Dever.
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2.

August 19, 2010, effective date of suspension pursuant to

Rule 14-526*
3.

January 24, 2011, filing of required affidavit with the

district court and service of the same upon OPC, pursuant to Rule
14-524.
4.. February 7, 2011, deadline for the filing of an objection
by OPC counsel, pursuant to Rule 14-524 and Rule 6(a), URCP«
5.

February 16, 2011, is the last day of the Court's 181 day

suspension, under its Order of Sanction dated July 20, 2010.
6.

February 17, 2011, Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V.

Rasmussen was signed by District Court Judge L. A. Dever, on the
182nd day after the effective date of suspension, pursuant to the
Court's Order of Sanction.
7.

February 18, 2011, date appearing on OPC's Memorandum in

Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen.
8.

February 19, 2011, six (6) months from the effective date

of the Court's Order of Sanction.
Again, the above timeline demonstrates conclusively that both
Respondent and the Court fully complied with the requirements of
Rule 14-524, while OPC counsel did not comply with the 10 days
deadline

to file its objection.

Therefore, without a

timely

objection by OPC counsel, it was not incumbent on the district
court to conduct a hearing in the matter.
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The

fact

that

Respondent

filed

Reinstatement needs to be explained.

a

Verified

Petition

for

On or about December 20,

2010, Respondent received a copy of a letter drafted by Diane
Akiyama, Assistant Counsel, OPC, containing the erroneous statement
that Respondent
"has been suspended for six months and a day.
... we [OPC] have not received anything from
Mr. Rasmussen regarding his obligations under
Rule 14-526 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline
and Disability.
I direct your attention to Rule 14-526 of the
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability with
respect to Mr. Rasmussen's responsibilities.".
While Respondent believed the above-mentioned content of OPC's
December 20, 2010, letter to be in error, based on the exact
wording of the Court's July 20, 2010, Order of Sanction, he decided
to file a Verified Petition for Reinstatement with the Court,
pursuant to Rule 14-525, and also to file an affidavit with OPC
counsel, pursuant to Rule 14-526.

This action was taken out of an

abundance of caution and fear, as Respondent was trying to avoid
complete financial ruin by covering all the bases in an effort to
eliminate any unnecessary delay in his reinstatement to practice
law.
Respondent had always operated under

the belief

that his

suspension was a Rule 14-524 suspension and, therefore, conducted
his affairs accordingly.

He also believed OPC considered his

suspension to be one of "6 months or less" when OPC remained
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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completely silent with regard to any perceived responsibilities
under Rule 14-526, including the filing of an affidavit with OPC
counsel that would have been due on or before August 19# 2010 • It
was not until after December 20, 2010, that Respondent received any
indication from OPC that it considered Rule 14-526 to be applicable
to his suspension.
OPC

five months

The December 20, 2010, letter was composed by

after

the execution of

the Court's Order of

Sanction and four months after the effective date of Respondent's
suspension, therefore, OPC should be estopped from asserting that
Rule 14-525 and 14-526 apply in this matter. As mentioned earlier,
the December 20, 2010, letter erroneously states that Respondent
was suspended for "6 months and a day", which is not the language
of the Court's Order•

If OPC truly believed that Rule 14-525

dealing with a suspension "more than six months" was applicable, it
should

have

timely

notified

Respondent

and/or

the

Court

of

Respondent's failure to file an affidavit with them, on or before,
August 19, 2010,

Clearly, OPC was silent on this matter, causing

Respondent to rely to his potential detriment on OPC's silence an
inactivity, while all the time holding fast to the language of the
Court's Order.

As to the interpretation of Rules 14-524, 14-525

and 14-526, it is unmistakable from the language of each respective
Rule that the relevant time period applicable to Respondent is
either "six months
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"

or less" or "more than six months".

" [S] ix months" is clearly

being used as a Term of Art, in the above-mentioned Rules of Lawyer
Discipline and Disability.

Nowhere in the relevant Rules is there

any reference to "days" being used as the metric for determing
whether a suspension is "six months or less" or "more than six
months".

Rules 14-524, 14-525, and 14-526 are unambiguous in the

use of the words "six months" as the appropriate marker of time
with respect
suggestion
months.

to a suspension.

in those Rules

Therefore,

There is absolutely no hint or

that 180 days is a synonym

Respondent

has

always

believed

for six
that

his

suspension was pursuant to Rule 14-524.

While Respondent filed a

Verified

of

Petition,

etc.

out

of

fear

confusion

and

delay

emanating from the erroneous content of OPC's letter dated December
20. 2010, he continued to reflect on the actual language of the
Court's Order of Sanction and was renewed in his belief that Rules
14-525 and 14-526 did not apply to his suspension. His belief was
further

renewed

suspension

in

the

fact

that

Rule

14-524

governed

thereby requiring OPC to file any objection

his

to his

reinstatement by February 7, 2011. With no objection being timely
filed by OPC counsel, Respondent

resolved

that he was

free to

approach the Court without any obstruction, challenge or objection
by OPC after the conclusion of his 181 day suspension.
lawfully,

courteously,

and without

delay

signed

Reinstatement
on February 17, 2011.
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the Order of
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In summary/ the Court's lawful Order reinstating Thomas V.
Rasmussen as an attorney at law in good standing in the State of
Utah should stand/ pursuant to Rule 14-524, and OPC should be
barred and estopped from objecting or arguing otherwise, as they
have not timely acted upon relevant deadlines contained in the
applicable Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
DATED this ZM

day of February, 2011.
THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN
Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the *^(

day of February, 2011/ I

caused to be hand delivered/ facsimiled/ or mailed postage pre-paid
a

true

and

correct

copy

of

the

Reply

to

the Memorandum

Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen.
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Billy L. Walker, #3358
Senior Counsel
Utah State Bar
Office of Professional Conduct
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)531-9110

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Discipline of:

Thomas V. Rasmussen #02693

])
}
|
I
>
]
I

THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT'S REPLY TO REPLY TO
ITS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT
OF THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN
Civil No. 090908841

Respondent.
Judge L. A. Dever

The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC"), by and through
Billy L. Walker, Senior Counsel, and in accordance with Rule 14-525 of the Rules of
Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"), hereby submits its Reply to Mr. Rasmussen's
Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V.
Rasmussen ("Order").
ARGUMENT
I.

THE OPC HAS MADE NO ERROR, ITS ACTIONS HAVE BEEN
CONSISTENT WITH ITS POSITION THAT MR. RASMUSSEN'S
REINSTATEMENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED PURSANT TO RLDD
14-525 NOT 14-524
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The OPC has made no error in this case. The OPC's actions have been consistent
with the position that the reinstatement of Mr. Rasmussen should fall under Rule 14-525,
not 14-524. Mr. Rasmussen's suspension was for one year with all but 181 days stayed,
which brings it clearly under Rule 14-525(a). Rule 14-525(a) reads as follows:
A respondent suspended for more than six months or a disbarred
respondent shall be reinstated or readmitted only upon order of the district
court. No respondent may petition for reinstatement until three months
before the period for suspension has expired. No respondent may petition
for readmission until five years after the effective date of disbarment. A
respondent who has been placed on interim suspension and is then
disbarred for the same misconduct that was the ground for the interim
suspension may petition for readmission at the expiration of five years from
the effective date of the interim suspension.
Furthermore, even if the non-stayed portion of the suspension (181 days) is the
standard for reinstatement there is no other reasonable conclusion that can be drawn by
the "181 days" determination by the Court other than six months and one day (i.e. 30 days
for a month) which also would place reinstatement

under Rule 14-525. It is

incomprehensible that the interpretation of 181 days is inconsistent with a six month and
one day suspension because the Court used days instead of months. A strict interpretation
of "six months" as a "term of art" does not make sense and in OPC's viewpoint is
inconsistent with the intent of the Court's Sanction Order.
The OPC did send a letter dated December 20, 2010, to Mr. Rasmussen's attorney
James Deans. A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". The letter was not sent
in error. The letter was sent for the following two reasons:
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a)

The OPC had received information that it was likely that Mr.
Rasmussen was practicing law while on suspension.1

b)

The OPC had not received information from Mr. Deans or Mr.
Rasmussen regarding Mr. Rasmussen's obligations under 14-526.
Specifically, Rule 14-526(b) requires as follows:
Notice to clients and others. In every case in which a respondent is
disbarred or suspended for more than six months, the respondent
shall, within 20 days of the entry of the order, accomplish the
following acts:
(1) notify each client and- any co-counsel in every pending legal
matter, litigation and non-litigation, that the respondent has been
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law and is disqualified
from further participation in the matter;
(2) notify each client that, in the absence of co-counsel, the client
should obtain a new lawyer, calling attention to the urgency to seek
new counsel, particularly in pending litigation;
(3) deliver to every client any papers or other property to which the
client is entitled or, if delivery cannot reasonably be made, make
arrangements satisfactory to the client or co-counsel of a reasonable
time and place where papers and other property may be obtained,
calling attention to any urgency to obtain the same;
(4) refund any part of any fee paid in advance that has not been
earned as of the effective date of the discipline;
(5) in each matter pending before a court, agency or tribunal, notify
opposing counsel or, in the absence of counsel, the adverse party, of
the respondent's disbarment or suspension and consequent
disqualification to further participate as a lawyer in the matter;

The OPC now has further information that Mr. Rasmussen was practicing during his suspension period and has
served discovery on Mr. Rasmussen for further verification. The OPC plans to present its evidence of Mr.
Rasmussen's unauthorized practice of law at the reinstatement hearing provided for in 14-525(g).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(6) file with the court, agency or tribunal before which any matter is
pending a copy of the notice given to opposing counsel or to an
adverse party; and
(7) within two days after the effective date of disbarment or
suspension, file an affidavit with OPC counsel showing complete
performance of the foregoing requirements of this rule. The
respondent shall keep and maintain for inspection by OPC counsel all
records of the steps taken to accomplish the requirement of this rule.
The O P C did not state the specifics of the rule in the letter. However,
the rule does not require OPC to notify Mr. Rasmussen of his
obligation under Rule 14-526. Thus, there was no error. The letter
was sent as a courtesy consistent with OPC's understanding and
position that Mr. Rasmussen was suspended for more than six
months and reinstatement needs to be pursuant to Rule 14-525.

It should be noted that Mr. Rasmussen is claiming he felt the OPC was acting in
error and his Verified Petition for Reinstatement "was taken out of an abundance of
caution and fear." However, never once, until Mr. Rasmussen's reply dated February 25,
2011, did Mr. Rasmussen state to the OPC that the OPC was making an error and never
once did Mr. Rasmussen do anything inconsistent with OPC's understanding that his
reinstatement would be pursuant to Rule 14-525. As a matter of fact, until now all of Mr.
Rasmussen's actions including filing a Verified Petition are consistent with reinstatement
under 14-525 not 14-524.
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II.

MR. RASMUSSEN'S REQUEST FOR REINSTATEMENT WAS AT BEST
NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 14-524 AND AT
WORST DECEPTIVE.

Even if Mr. Rasmussen was entitled to reinstatement under Rule 14-524 his filing
was at best not consistent with Rule 14-524 and at worst deceptive. Under Rule 14-524:
A respondent who has been suspended for six months or less pursuant to
disciplinary proceedings shall be reinstated at the end of the period of
suspension upon filing with the district court and serving upon OPC counsel
an affidavit stating that the respondent has fully complied with the
requirements of the suspension order and that the respondent has fully
reimbursed the Bar's Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection for any amounts
paid on account of the respondent's conduct Within ten days, OPC counsel
may file an objection and thereafter the district court shall conduct a hearing.
Mr. Rasmussen submitted a document titled "Verified Petition" to the OPC. In this
Verified Petition he claims to be in "compliance with the terms and conditions of the
Court's Order of Sanction, dated July 20, 2010." He did not submit a document titled
"Affidavit" making this claim. He did submit two Affidavits to the OPC, one claims he did
not "practice law for a total of 181 days up to his anticipated reinstatement" The other
Affidavit refers to compliance with 14-526. The 14-526 "Affidavit" on the face of the
language of 14-524 is inapplicable to 14-524 because 14-524 is for suspensions of six
months or less and 14-526(b) where an Affidavit is required is for suspensions of more
than six months.
The significance of not titling the "Verified Petition" document "Affidavit" is: Had Mr.
Rasmussen submitted an Affidavit for reinstatement claiming he had complied with all the
conditions of the Court's Sanction Order, the OPC would have been alerted of Mr.
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Rasmussen's position that 14-524 was the applicable rule for his reinstatement The OPC
would have then acted accordingly and submitted its objection to the Court within 10 days.
Instead, the OPC noted the document as a "Verified Petition" as allowed for under 14525(b) and proceeded under 14-525. This included submitting a request to have
publication of the notice of Mr. Rasmussen's petition in the Bar Journal pursuant to 14525(d). Attached as Exhibit "B" is a copy of this notice.
Furthermore, even if the Court views a Verified Petition as sufficient under 14-524,
if it was Mr. Rasmussen's intent to be reinstated pursuant to Rule 14-524 and not 14-525,
his designation of his request for reinstatement as a Verified Petition consistent with the
language of 14-525 was deceptive.2 The OPC was deceived and Mr. Rasmussen should
not benefit from this deception.
111.

IN OBTAINING HIS ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT, MR.
RASMUSSEN DID NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 7 OF THE RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 7(f)(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing
party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the
other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision.
Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after
service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon
being served with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object.

2

It was especially deceptive when combined with Mr. Rasmussen's other actions, i.e. his reference to 14-526 in one
of his Affidavits and his request to be "reinstated at the earliest possible time" in his Petition. In this respect under
Rule 14-524, a respondent would not have to request be reinstated at the earliest possible time, because the rule
provides for reinstatement at the end of the period of suspension uponfilingof the Affidavit.
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The OPC received Mr. Rasmussen's proposed Order of Reinstatement on
February 17, 2011 at 4:30 pm. The OPC was not allowed the five days to object to Mr.
Rasmussen's order. Rather the Order was signed on the same day it was presented to
the Court and the OPC.

CONCLUSION
There has been no error made by the Office of Professional Conduct in this case.
All of its actions have been consistent with its understanding and position that Mr.
Rasmussen's reinstatement should be governed by Rule 14-525 of the Rules of Lawyer
Discipline and Disability, not 14-524 of these rules. Furthermore, notwithstanding Mr.
Rasmussen's reply, all of his actions have also been consistent with reinstatement under
14-525. Therefore, the OPC respectfully requests that the Court set aside its
Reinstatement Order of February 17, 2011 and allow this matter to proceed in accordance
with Rule 14-525.
DATED this 2 ^ day of February, 2011.

ff.VJjlj
Billy L. Walker
Senior Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of February, 2011, I caused to be mailed a
true and correct copy of The Office of Professional Conduct's Reply to Reply to Its
Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen to:
Thomas V. Rasmussen
4659 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

;
^
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I
Office of Professional Conduct
645 South 200 East, Suite 205 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3834
Telephone: (801) 531-9110 • FAX: (801) 531-9912 • 1-800-698-9077
E-mail: opc@utahbar.org

December 20, 2010

James H. Deans
440 South 700 East #101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

in the Matter of the Discipline of Thomas V. Rasmussen
Civil No. 090908841

]'""

Dear Mr. Deans:
This morning the OPC was notified that Mr. Rasmussen called the 8th
District Court and held himself out as an attorney representing a client. It also
appears that Mr. Rasmussen did not notify the court of his suspension. As you
are aware, the Order of Sanction in this matter was. signed on July 21, 2010.
Pursuant to Rule 14-526 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, unless
otherwise stated in the order, a suspension is effective 30 days after the.date of
the order.
Because Mr. Rasmussen has been suspended for six months and a day,
he may not represent clients, hold himself out as an attorney or otherwise
engage in the practice of law. If Mr. Rasmussen continues to practice while on
suspension the OPC will file an Order to Show Cause. Also to date, we have.notreceived anything from Mr. Rasmussen regarding his obligations under Rule 14526 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
I direct your attention to Rule 14-526 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline
and Disability with respect to Mr. Rasmussen's responsibilities. Thank you for
your attention to this matter

Sincerely,

Diane Akiyama
Assistant Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
DA/aw
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Notice of Petition for Reinstatement to the Utah State Bar
by Thomas V. Rasmussen
Pursuant to Rule 14-525(d), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, the Utah
State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct hereby publishes notice of
Respondent's Verified Petition for Reinstatement and Affidavit of Thomas V.
Rasmussen ("Petition") filed by Thomas V. Rasmussen in In the Matter of the
Discipline of Thomas V. Rasmussen, Third Judicial District Court, Civil No.
090908841. Any individuals wishing to oppose or concur with the Petition are
requested to do so within thirty days of the date of this publication by filing notice
with the District Court.
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Billy L. Walker, #3358

Senior Counsel
Utah State Bar
Office of Professional Conduct
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)531-9110
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Discipline of:

)
)
|
)
)
|

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR THE COURT TO
CONSIDER EVIDENCE OF
THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN'S
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ITS
SANCTIONS ORDER

Thomas V. Rasmussen #02693
Respondent.

i

Civil No. 090908841
Judge L. A. Dever

The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC"), by and through
Billy L. Walker, Senior Counsel, and in accordance with Rule 7(c) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, and this Court's Ruling issued as a result of the March 8, 2011 hearing,
hereby submits its Memorandum in Support of Motion for the Court to Consider
Evidence of Thomas V. Rasmussen's Failure to Comply with its Sanctions Order dated
July 21, 2010.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On July 21, 2010 the Court entered a Sanctions Order which stated:
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The Court will enter a suspension for one year in this matter but will
stay all but 181 days. The Court is staying the imposition of the
remaining time upon the following terms and conditions:
1.

That he [Mr. Rasmussen] enter and complete an ethics and
professional conduct course by the end of the 181 day
suspension.

2.

That he [Mr. Rasmussen] not practice law during the
suspension and so certify that fact by affidavit.

3.

That he [Mr. Rasmussen] have no violations of the rules for
one year from the date of this Order.

4.

That he [Mr. Rasmussen] will initiate a change in his office
procedure whereby he [Mr. Rasmussen] personally
communicates with the Court, its staff and opposing counsel
and all such communication will be memorialized in his case
file and will include the date, time and named individual
communicated with. Additionally, all changes of court dates
must be followed by written communication to the Court.

2.

The effective date of the Sanctions Order was August 19, 2010.

3.

Mr. Rasmussen filed a Verified Petition 158 days from the effective date of

the Sanctions Order on January 24, 2011 stating he had complied with the terms and
conditions of the Sanctions Order.
4.

Mr. Rasmussen also, 158 days from the effective date of the Sanctions

Order, filed an Affidavit dated January 24, 2011 stating he had not practiced law for a
total of 181 days up to the time of his anticipated reinstatement.
5,

Mr. Rasmussen was readmitted by Court Order on February 17, 2011.
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ARGUMENT
I.

MR. RASMUSEN HAS PRACTICED LAW THROUGH THE DURATION
OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF HIS SUSPENSION

The second term and condition of the Court's Order instructed Mr. Rasmussen,
not to "practice law during the suspension and so certify that fact by affidavit." Yet on
December 22, 2010, Judge Vernice Trease, Third District Court, contacted the OPC
regarding Mr. Rasmussen. Mr. Rasmussen appeared in Judge Trease's court on
December 17, 2010 in case 101905250, State of Utah vs. Michael Charles Smoot After
the OPC learned of Mr. Rasmussen's appearance before Judge Trease, and in
anticipation of Mr. Rasmussen's request for reinstatement, the OPC contacted the
Administrative Offices of the Courts and requested a list of all of Mr. Rasmussen's
cases. From that listing the OPC created a spreadsheet chronicling Mr. Rasmussen's
extensive and flagrant refusal to comply with the Court's Order. A copy of the
spreadsheet is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
The OPC is in the process of obtaining certified dockets of all the cases
represented on the spreadsheet. Once obtained, the OPC will present this evidence to
the Court. The spreadsheet details the name of the client, case numbers, and dates
when Mr. Rasmussen appeared in court, filed pleadings with the court, or had his office
contact the Court. After the effective date of the suspension, Mr. Rasmussen had a
case in Federal Court, cases in 13 Justice Courts (South Jordan, Box Elder, Draper,
Herriman, Davis, Salt Lake County, South Salt Lake, Taylorsville, Bluffdale, Midvale,
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Summit, Sevier, and Utah County) and in three District Courts (Eighth - Duchesne,
Eighth - Uintah, and Third - Salt Lake City). More specifically, according to the dockets
Mr. Rasmussen made 36 appearances on cases; filed 17 pleadings in cases and had
his office contact the court on cases nine times after the effective date of his
suspension.
II.

SINCE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF HIS SUSPENSION THE OPC HAS
RECEIVED ONE OFFICIAL BAR COMPLAINT AND TWO UNOFFICIAL
BAR COMPLAINTS AGAINST MR. RASMUSSEN ALLEGING RULE OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT VIOLATIONS.1

One official Bar Complaint was filed with the OPC against Mr. Rasmussen on or
about September 10, 2010 by Kevin Loughrin. Mr. Rasmussen was retained for a
federal court criminal case prior to the effective date of his suspension in June 2010. Mr.
Loughrin alleges that during the representation Mr. Rasmussen did not adequately
communicate with him, including a failure to provide Mr. Loughrin with information that
Mr. Rasmussen received in discovery until repeated requests had been made. Based
on the lack of communication, Mr. Loughrin asked Mr. Rasmussen to withdraw from the
case, which Mr. Rasmussen did on or about October 5, 2010. However, before Mr.
Rasmussen's withdrawal according to Mr. Loughrin subsequent counsel, Mr.
Rasmussen threatened Mr. Loughrin with respect to his sentencing recommendation, if

Official Bar Complaints have to be notarized and verified attesting to the accuracy of the information pursuant to
Rule 14-510(a)(2) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. The OPC can consider unofficial Bar
Complaints pursuant to Rule 14-504(b)(2) of these Rules.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A

he did not drop his Bar Complaint. These allegations raise the possibility of violations of
Rule 1.4 (Communication) and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice under
Rule 8.4(d) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Furthermore, Mr.
Rasmussen appeared in Court and filed pleadings on Mr. Loughrin's behalf after the
effective date of his suspension as noted in Exhibit A.
Mr. Mark Rasmussen filed an unofficial Bar Complaint with the OPC on about
November 15, 2010. Mr. Mark Rasmussen was "given" a DUI on or about August 20,
2010. Mr. Mark Rasmussen paid Mr. Rasmussen $1200.00 for representation on the
DUI. According to Mr. Mark Rasmussen, Mr. Rasmussen failed to appear at the
hearings and did not return phone calls between November 4, 2010 and November 15,
2010. These allegations raise the possibility of violations of 1.1 (Competence) and 1.4
(Communication) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Additionally, based on the dates
of Mr. Mark Rasmussen's allegations, it appears that the entire representation occurred
after the effective date of Mr. Rasmussen's suspension.
Mr. Troy Bragg filed an unofficial Bar Complaint on or about December 10, 2010.
Mr. Bragg was charged with several felonies. Mr. Rasmussen filed an appearance of
counsel on behalf of Mr. Bragg on or about June 10, 2010. Mr. Bragg claimed he paid
Mr. Rasmussen approximately $7000.00 to get a plea agreement. However, on or about
October 19, 2010, according to the court docket Mr. Rasmussen withdrew because Mr.
Bragg lost his job and was unable to continue to pay Mr. Rasmussen. Mr. Bragg claims
that Mr. Rasmussen's progress in the case was not consistent with what he was paid.
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These allegations raise the possibility of an excessive fee and a violation of rule 1.5
(Fees) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Furthermore, again, Mr. Rasmussen
appeared in court and filed pleadings on behalf of Mr. Bragg in the Eighth District Vernal Uintah County after the effective date of his suspension. See Exhibit A.
The complaints filed by Loughrin, Mark Rasmussen, and Bragg on their face
raise the real possibility that Mr. Rasmussen violated the Rules of Professional
Conduct. If this is the case, Mr. Rasmussen violated the second term of the Court's
Sanction Order that "he have no violations of the Rules for one year from the dates of
[the] Order." And as outlined above, Mr. Rasmussen practiced law after the effective
date of his suspension in each of the cases.
Hi.

MR. RASMUSSEN SHOULD BE DISBARRED

Based on the evidence of Mr. Rasmussen's continued disregard of the Court's
Sanction Order, the OPC requests that the Court impose additional discipline pursuant
to Rule 14-606(a) of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. This rule states:
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the
factors set out in Rule 14-604, the following principles generally apply in
cases involving prior discipline, (a) The district court or Supreme Court
may impose further sanctions upon a lawyer who violates the terms of a
prior disciplinary order.
Mr. Rasmussen clearly knew the effective date of his suspension was August 19,
2010. See Mr. Rasmussen's reference to this in his timeline in the Reply to
Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen filed
on February 25, 2011. Mr. Rasmussen also claims to have not practiced law for 181
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days as of February 17, 2011, the date of his reinstatement. February 17, 2011 is 182
days from August 19, 2010.
Notwithstanding Mr. Rasmussen's claim, the evidence seems to show an
extensive and flagrant continuing practice of law. Thus, given the extensive and flagrant
continuing practice of law activities of Mr. Rasmussen, the OPC respectfully requests
that Mr. Rasmussen be disbarred consistent with the case of In re Richard Johnson 830
P.2d 262 (Utah 1992). In that case Mr. Johnson was initially suspended for six months.
However, during the six month suspension period Mr. Johnson continued to practice law
"in flagrant disregard of this court's order of suspension dated March 29, 1990." Based
on this the Court disbarred Mr. Johnson.2
It should also be noted that Mr. Rasmussen has an additional level of dishonesty
as represented by filing an affidavit with the Court certifying that he had not practiced
law for 181 days up to the time of his anticipated reinstatement. The evidence shows
otherwise.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Rasmussen has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by practicing
throughout the effective date of his suspension which is clearly a violation of the Court's

2

The Johnson case is to be contrasted with In re Russell T. Doncouse 99 P.3d 837 (Utah 2004) where an attorney
initially was suspended for 90 days; practiced law while suspended and the Utah Supreme Court increased the
suspension to three years. The Supreme Court specifically distinguished Doncouse from Johnson by stating that Mr.
Doncouse's activities were not as "extensive orflagrantas Johnson's nor did they engender new complaints with the
Bar." Mr. Rasmussen's practice of law activities are numerous like Johnson's and like Johnson did generate new Bar
Complaints.
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Sanction's Order. Furthermore, new Bar Complaints submitted to the OPC raise the real
possibility that Mr. Rasmussen violated the Rules of Professional Conduct which is also a
violation of the Sanctions Order. The OPC respectfully requests that the Court determine
that the appropriate sanction for Mr. Rasmussen's blatant refusal to comply with the
Court's Order is disbarment.
DATED this ^

day of March, 2011.

Billy L Walker
Senior Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of March, 2011, I caused to be mailed a true
and correct copy of the Memorandum in Support of Motion for the Court to Consider
Evidence of Thomas V. Rasmussen's Failure to Comply with Sanctions Order to:
James H. Deans
440 South 700 East #101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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Case No.
1101800285

Client's Name
AbefRobledo

1101800278

Christopher Wiersma

104800042

Christopher Wiersma

J101905987

Jacque Clarke

101905250

Michael Smoot

101904427

Breanna Zehnder

101903156

R. Steele Maxfield

101901215

Jeremias Mullins

091908954

Lamar Bowman Jr.

101800246

Troy Bragg

Court
Eighth
Duchesne
Eighth
Duchesne
Eighth
Duchesne
Third
Salt Lake City
Third
Salt Lake City
Third
Salt Lake City
Third
Salt Lake City
Third
Salt Lake City

Third
Salt Lake city
Eighth
Uintah

Appearance

Pleadings Filed
10/22/2010

10/7/2010
10/18/2010
9/16/2010
10/7/2010
10/14/2010
11/18/2010
12/14/2010
9/21/2010
12/17/2010
8/20/2010
9/21/2010
10/12/2010
9/17/2010

9/30/2010

8/30/2010
10/18/2010
11/8/2010
11/15/2010
8/20/2010
9/10/2010
10/19/2010

10/1/2010

Called Court

1/18/2011

8/23/2010
11/18/2010
9/7/2010

9/9/2010
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Case No.
105806113

Client's Name
Saravanan Thangaraj

Court
South Jordan

105005091
101100502

James Willis
R. Douglas Poole

Box Elder
Draper

101300136
105011468
105606717
105504766
105107297
101200072

John Gibson
Preston Tait
Glen Webster
Courtney Garcia
Trudy Robertson
Kirk Rindlisbach

Herriman
Davis
Salt Lake Co.
South Salt Lake
Taylorsville
Bluffdale

105007198
105203006

Feuan Nhothibouth
Justin Nielsen

Midvale
Summit

101000469

Elton Richard Cox

Midvale

101600453
105036696
105101250
2:10-cr-00478

Patrick Drowne
Scott Sullivan
Robert Hatch
Kevin Loughrin

Salt Lake County
Sevier
Utah County
Federal Court |

Appearance
12/7/2010

12/3/2010

12/14/2010
10/6/2010
11/2/2010
10/13/2010
11/10/2010
11/4/2010
8/31/2010
12/7/2010
10/15/2010

9/13/2010
11/16/2010
8/25/2010
8/20/2010
10/5/2010

Pleadings Filed
11/9/2010
12/14/2010
11/4/2010
12/13/2010
11/10/2010
10/22/2010
10/18/2010
8/20/2010
10/8/2010

10/11/2010

Called Court
12/14/2010
1/27/2011

!

10/6/2010

12/13/2010
9/7/2010
9/29/2010

10/14/2010
9/13/2010
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